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INTRODUCTION
The institution of acquisitive prescription has startling transformative
power.1 A person who commences possession of immovable property in
Copyright 2017, by JOHN A. LOVETT.
* De Van D. Daggett, Jr. Distinguished Professor, Loyola University New
Orleans College of Law. This Article is dedicated to the memory of André van de
Walt (1956-2016), the holder of the South African Research Chair in Property
Law at Stellenbosch University, South Africa, who invited me to visit his research
group and present an early draft of this Article in March 2016. His contribution to
property law scholarship across the world is beyond measure. I also wish to thank
Hanri Mostert, Cheryl Young, Cornelius van de Merwe, Jacques du Plessis,
Hanoch Dagan, Joseph Singer, John Blevins, Nicholas Davrados, Melissa
Lonegrass, and Sally Ann Richardson for their encouragements and valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the
outstanding research assistance of Aimee Chalin and Emily Breaux.
1. As French commentators G. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Albert Tissier once
remarked, “Prescription is the transformation of a state of fact in a state of law.” G.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & ALBERT TISSIER, PRESCRIPTION: TRAITE THEORIQUE ET
PRACTIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS ¶ 275, at 145 (La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1972) (4th ed. 1924).
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good faith and with a just title can acquire ownership that is good against
the world after just ten years of uninterrupted possession.2 Even more
remarkable is that a possessor who does not commence possession in good
faith or who lacks a just title can still acquire ownership of an immovable
after 30 years of uninterrupted possession.3 Finally, a person who merely
uses another person’s land in a limited manner can acquire a real right in the
form of an apparent servitude through either ten or 30 years of quasipossession.4
According to several Louisiana jurists and commentators, the venerable
institution of acquisitive prescription in Louisiana is now under threat.5 The
source of that threat is a recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. In
Boudreaux v. Cummings,6 the plaintiff, John Boudreaux, and his
ancestors-in-title had used a pathway across his neighbor’s property since
1948 to gain access to a public road and to transport farm equipment to
and from the property.7 In 2012, Paul Cummings, the new owner of the
adjacent land, prevented Boudreaux from using the pathway.8 Boudreaux
sued, claiming that he and his ancestors-in-title had acquired a predial
servitude across Cummings’s land by virtue of 30 years of uninterrupted
quasi-possession.9 Cummings defended the lawsuit by arguing that
Boudreaux’s possession did not count for purposes of acquisitive
prescription because it had always been “precarious,” that is, it had been
exercised “with the permission of or on behalf of the owner.”10 Although
2. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3473–3476 (2016) (providing for ten-year acquisitive
prescription of immovables for a possessor with just title and good faith; providing
that possessor need only have good faith at commencement of possession).
3. Id. arts. 3486–3488.
4. Id. arts. 740, 742.
5. See Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 568 (La. 2015) (Knoll, J.,
dissenting) (warning that the majority decision in Boudreaux “severely jeopardizes
the law on acquisitive prescription in this state”); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL
SERVITUDES § 6.36, in LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2013 & Supp.
2016) (reiterating Justice Knoll’s warning and advising that the majority holding in
Boudreaux “should not be read broadly and should not be read to equate permission
with a landowner’s awareness and failure to object to a disturbance or eviction”);
Andrew M. Cox, Boudreaux v. Cummings: The Louisiana Supreme Court
Presumes Away the Right to Acquire a Servitude of Passage, 90 TUL. L. REV. 973,
984 (2016) (suggesting that faulty reasoning in Boudreaux “looms dangerously over
the right to prescribe a servitude of passage”).
6. 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015).
7. Id. at 560.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 561 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2011)).
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the trial court and a majority of the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal ruled in favor of Boudreaux, a narrow four-justice majority of the
Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and held that Boudreaux’s quasipossession of the right of way was, in fact, precarious, and thus could not
lead to acquisitive prescription.11
More particularly, the majority opinion in Boudreaux appears to
undermine the strong presumption in favor of possessors found in article
3427 of the Civil Code.12 Relying on commentary interpreting an article
from the 1870 Civil Code and its source article in the French Civil Code
of 1804,13 the majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
Boudreaux’s use of the pathway across his neighbor’s property occurred
with the “implied or tacit permission” of his original neighbors as a
“gesture of neighborly accommodation.”14 Despite the strong presumption
in favor of a possessor expressed in article 3427, the majority held that
“under the limited circumstances where ‘indulgence’ and acts of ‘good
neighborhood’ are present,” the possessor’s acts of possession are
presumed to have occurred with the owner’s “tacit permission.”15 Thus, as
the Court put it, “Cummings’[s] awareness of Boudreaux’s use and his
allowance thereof marks Boudreaux’s use as an authorized use that cannot
be characterized as adverse under the circumstances.”16 In apparent
recognition of the difficult legal and factual issues the case raised, the
majority took the unusual step of stating that its holding in Boudreaux was
“strictly limited to the facts before us.”17
Justice Jeannette Knoll authored a blistering dissent in Boudreaux.
She contends that the majority decision “eviscerates the well-established
burden-shifting structure laid out in our Civil Code” by allowing an owner
to prevail in an acquisitive prescription case based simply on an assertion
of “neighborliness” without having to introduce any evidence that a
11. Id. at 562–64.
12. See id at 566. (“One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he
began to possess in the name of and for another.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 (2016)).
13. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 139, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 1997).
14. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562.
15. Id. at 563.
16. Id. at 564. The majority’s reference to the awareness of Cummings is
itself confusing because the period of tacit permission would have begun during
the ownership of Cummings’ predecessor-in-title. As discussed in Part III, Justice
Weimer’s concurring opinion focuses more extensively—and properly—on the
relationship between Boudreaux and Cumming’s predecessor-in-title—the
Weills. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 568–72 (Weimer, J., concurring).
17. Id.
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claimant’s possession is actually precarious.18 Two other justices joined
Justice Knoll in dissent.19 Penning a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice
John Weimer agreed with the majority’s disposition of the case but justified
his conclusion based on additional facts in the record while also reflecting on
the utilitarian and moral values that both support and complicate 30-year “bad
faith” acquisitive prescription in Louisiana.20
This Article seeks to place the controversy spawned by the majority opinion
in Boudreaux—and in particular the controversy over precarious possession—
in a broader doctrinal framework. At the outset, however, this framework
acknowledges that precarious possession has rarely been a problem in cases
involving claims of ten-year, good-faith acquisitive prescription. In those cases,
although precarious possession could theoretically be asserted as a defense
by a landowner, courts primarily focus on whether the claimant actually
possessed the land at issue by virtue of a “just title,”21 or whether the
claimant’s profession of “good faith” was reasonable in light of objective
circumstances.22 With that caveat in place, this Article takes aim at the
problem of precarious possession in the context of bad-faith acquisitive
prescription or when bad-faith acquisitive prescription is likely to be
asserted after the completion of a possessory action.
To address whether precarious possession is actually undermining the
institution of acquisitive prescription, this Article takes a step back and
looks at a broad range of precarious possession cases decided in the last
50 years in Louisiana. This broader review reveals that almost all
precarious possession disputes fall into one of three different relational
contexts. The first involves parties who are more or less strangers to one
another. In the second, parties find themselves connected to one another
through a contractual relationship or by virtue of some special legal status,
typically a co-ownership or family relationship, or some other sui generis
special relationship. The third context involves parties who are neighbors

18. Id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
19. Justice Crichton also authored his own short dissenting opinion in which
he contended that the legal presumption to which Boudreaux was entitled as a
possessor combined with Cummings’s failure to present any evidence to rebut that
presumption should have mandated affirming the lower court rulings. Id. at 572–
73 (Crichton, J., dissenting). Justice Hughes dissented for the reasons given by
both Justice Knoll and Justice Crichton. Id. at 572.
20. Id. at 568–72 (Knoll, J. dissenting).
21. Compare Cantrelle v. Gaude, 700 So. 2d 523 (La. Ct. App. 1997), with
Barrios v. Panepinto, 133 So. 3d 36, 38 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
22. See, e.g., Philips v. Parker, 483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986); Mai v. Floyd, 951
So. 2d 244 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
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and know one another relatively well or who are at least members of the
same relatively small or tight-knit community.
In the first two classes of cases, the rules and presumptions located in
the Louisiana Civil Code and developed by Louisiana courts tend to
operate effectively. With some notable exceptions, these first two kinds of
precarious possession cases—stranger cases and contractual or legal status
cases—yield relatively predicable results that are consistent with many of
the utilitarian and natural rights justifications traditionally offered both to
support and limit acquisitive prescription.
Cases involving neighbors and members of close-knit communities,
however, tend to create more challenges. In this third category of
acquisitive prescription cases, the results appear, just as in Boudreaux,
more unstable and unpredictable. In these cases, the powerful normative
arguments justifying acquisitive prescription conflict sharply with the
normative justifications for the limiting effect of precarious possession. To
help parties and courts resolve these difficult neighbor and close-knit
community cases, Louisiana law needs a more refined approach. First,
Louisiana courts must forthrightly acknowledge the long-term, mutually
beneficial relationships that are at the heart of these especially difficult
cases. Second, Louisiana courts should consider applying a presumption of
sharing in these cases.
With this new presumption of sharing, this Article introduces a principle
that will honor an important normative value that already underlies much of
Louisiana property law and that courts often expressly recognize. The
principle is that neighbors should be encouraged, as Judge Weimer himself
recognized in Boudreaux, to act “as a good neighbor in allowing use of
[their] property.”23 Louisiana law should create incentives for neighbors
to form relationships of mutual support and accommodation. It should
reward, not punish, neighbors who share their resources with one another.
It should respect neighbors who engage in cooperative practices that
enable all members of a close-knit community to gain access to the
resources they need to flourish as human beings. The presumption of
sharing this Article calls for will validate the moral impulse that Louisiana
judges often recognize in these kinds of cases. Accordingly, owners who
appear to have granted their neighbors consent to possess or access their
property would, at the outset of that relationship at least, benefit from a
presumption that they are sharing their property with a neighbor who needs
it for some limited purpose.
At some point in time, however, typically after a long pattern of
continuous activity, possession that began with an implied permission of the
23. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 572.
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owner and that was motivated by a normatively attractive desire to share
resources can lead non-owners to believe that they have acquired real rights
in the property to which they have gained access. The non-owners may
begin to organize their affairs in a manner that depends on the continuing
access to the neighbor’s property. They may make investments in their own
property or make improvements in the neighbor’s property that are
grounded in a reasonable expectation that access will continue. Further, as
time passes, the original parties, as well as their heirs, descendants, and
successors, may forget the circumstances surrounding the original implied
permission that led to the original access or possession. Indeed, possessors
might quite reasonably come to believe that they are possessing just as an
owner would possess or that they are enjoying another’s property in the
same manner a servitude holder would enjoy it.
In these situations, possessors should have the ability to rebut the
presumption of sharing by introducing evidence to show that the originally
permissive nature of the possession has been transformed into possession as
owner. Article 3439 of the Civil Code recognizes this necessity in part by
providing that “co-owner[s]” can begin to possess adversely by demonstrating
“overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice” to their co-owners and
by recognizing that “[a]ny other precarious possessor[s]” can begin to
possess adversely by giving “actual notice” of their intentions to the
owner.24 In cases involving neighbors and members of close-knit
communities, however, in which possession may have occurred for
especially long periods of time and memories are likely to have faded, the
“actual notice” standard of article 3439 often fails. It fails because it is too
rigid and formalistic a tool for courts to use in these complex relational
contexts. In response to this inflexibility, this Article proposes to allow a
neighbor or close-knit community member to rebut the presumption of
sharing in the specific relational context of a neighbor dispute by
demonstrating the termination of precarious possession by resorting to a
set of indicia of giving or renunciation. Collectively, these indicia provide
an outer limit on the presumption of sharing and give courts a set of specific
criteria to use in determining when the presumption of sharing has reached its
breaking point.25
This Article’s observation that precarious possession serves as a doctrinal
safety valve to reign in or limit bad-faith acquisitive prescription’s startling
transformative power has a curious common law analogue. In 1983, Professor
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439 (2016).
25. This Article recognizes that courts should always be cognizant that an
“acknowledgment” of another person’s property or contractual rights, whether
“formal or informal, express or tacit,” can interrupt prescription. See LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3464 cmt. c.
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Richard Helmholz published a seminal article regarding the role of subjective
intent in American adverse possession law.26 Helmholz argued that common
law courts were consistently rejecting assertions of adverse possession when
it appeared that the claimant did not possess the disputed land in good faith.27
According to Helmholz, this practice of favoring good-faith claimants
contradicted hornbook law, which consistently took the position that an
adverse possessor’s subjective intent was irrelevant as long as the claimants
could show that their possession was “hostile,” that is, not permissive.28
Although Helmholz’s claim about the powerful sub-rosa importance of good
faith in adverse possession was challenged by another eminent scholar at the
time,29 the important point for Louisiana is that there is evidence that other
U.S. courts are often uncomfortable with the end result of adverse
possession or acquisitive prescription, especially when an adverse
possessor in bad faith is poised to acquire ownership or a prescriptive
servitude.
Part I of this Article briefly traces the historical evolution of acquisitive
prescription in civil law with a particular emphasis on the debate over
whether bad-faith acquisitive prescription should be permitted to overcome
the rights of formal titleholders. This Part also evaluates how French and
Louisiana commentators have understood the role of precarious possession
as a doctrine limiting acquisitive prescription. Finally, it reviews the solid
policy justifications for Louisiana’s two-tier good- and bad-faith acquisitive
prescription regime.
Part II sets forth a taxonomy of precarious possession cases in Louisiana
and shows how Louisiana courts have resolved stranger cases and
contractual relationship and legal status cases with relative consistency. This
Part concludes by showing that neighbor and close-knit community cases,
26. R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH.
U.L.Q. 331 (1983).
27. Id. at 339–40.
28. Id. at 331–33.
29. Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A
Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1986). Cunningham contended
that most U.S. courts—those not bound by a statute or state supreme court
precedent requiring the adverse possessor to have a good-faith belief he was
possessing as owner—still adhered to the objective interpretation of the “hostile
by claim of right” element and, moreover, that most of the decisions adverse to
bad-faith possessors upon which Helmholz relied could be explained on other
grounds. Id. Although Helmholz and Cunningham continued their debate, the
controversy has never been definitively resolved. See R.H. Helmholz, More on
Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 65
(1986); Roger A. Cunningham, More on Adverse Possession: A Rejoinder to
Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1167 (1986).
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however, are especially difficult for Louisiana courts to resolve and tend to
produce the most inconsistent results.
Finally, Part III explains why, in the most difficult category of
precarious possession cases—those involving neighbors or members of the
same close-knit community—Louisiana law would be well served by the
introduction of a presumption of sharing and an indicia of renunciation or
giving. After explaining this new framework for category three cases and
addressing some likely objections, the conclusion of Part III returns to
Boudreaux v. Cummings and shows how that case might have been
resolved in light of this new framework.
I. UP FROM ROME
A. Acquisitive Prescription in the Civil Law Tradition
Although most of this Article addresses developments in Louisiana
precarious possession jurisprudence that have occurred over the last 50
years, it is impossible to assess those developments without some
understanding of the Roman, Spanish, and French sources of Louisiana
law on acquisitive prescription and precarious possession in particular.
This Section emphasizes three crucial points about pre-codification civil
law: first, the variability of Roman law over time with respect to the
requirements of good faith and just title for acquisitive prescription;
second, the dispute in pre-codification French law over the propriety of
recognizing bad-faith acquisitive prescription; and third, the acceptance of
a Romanist, as opposed to a Canonist, conception of acquisitive
prescription when France finally codified its civil law in the Code
Napoleon.
1. Roman Law and Pre-Codification French Law
Louisiana’s double-barreled institution of good- and bad-faith acquisitive
prescription is derived from French and Spanish law and thus ultimately from
Roman law. Roman law on acquisitive prescription was neither static nor
simple. From the time of the Twelve Tables to Justinian’s compilation,
Roman law recognized that possession could lead to acquisition of ownership
through either usucapio or prescriptio. At various time periods during the
Roman Empire, Roman law required that the possessor have a title and
possess in good faith. At other historical moments, it recognized the
possibility that individuals whom Louisiana law might classify as bad-faith
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possessors could also acquire ownership.30 For instance, in the later imperial
period, Roman law recognized both the institutions of longi temporis
praescriptio, that is, long-term prescription, which required just title and good
faith,31 and longissimi temporis praescriptio, that is, very long-term
prescription, which allowed a possessor who lacked title or good faith to plead
30-year prescription as a defense to an action in revendication.32 Eventually
Justinian’s compilation codified a form of long-term prescription that required
good faith and 10 to 20 years of possession and made very long-term
prescription an affirmative mode of acquisition that required good faith at the
commencement of the possession.33
The nature of acquisition prescription with respect to immovables in precodification French law was no less contested. During the early post-Roman
period, some regions of France followed written law, that is, Roman law, on
acquisitive prescription, but in other regions customary law resisted the
influence of Roman law and preserved idiosyncratic prescription rules.34 Yet
even in areas where Roman law was followed, the difficulty of meeting the
requirements of good faith, just title, and 10 to 20 years of possession meant
that in practice 30-year prescription, which did not require title, was often the
primary means of prescription.35 In regions where local custom was followed,
both the 10-to-20-year and 30-year prescriptions were used.36
The regional conflicts over the actual law in practice also mirrored a
deeper philosophical debate in France. Advocates of canon law, as BaudryLacantinerie and Tissier explain, “generally tried to inject morality and equity
into the institution of prescription,”37 ignored the utilitarian goals of
prescription, and tried to limit the institution to one providing merely a

30. See generally Ernst J. Marais, Acquisitive Prescription in View of the
Property Clause 18–27 (Aug. 5, 2011) (L.L.D. Dissertation, University of
Stellenbosch) (discussing Tabula 6.3 of the Twelve Tables); DAVID JOHNSTON,
ROMAN LAW IN CONTEXT 57 (1999); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ROMAN LAW 122–24 (1st ed. 1975); BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note
1, ¶¶ 3–8, at 4–6.
31. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 8–10, at 6–7;
NICHOLAS, supra note 30, at 128.
32. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 11, at 7.
33. Id.; NICHOLAS, supra note 30, at 127.
34. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 9. Domat also
noted the regional diversity of approaches to acquisitive prescription in the precodification era. 1 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 869, ¶
2189 (William Strahan trans., Little, Brown & Co. 1853) (1694).
35. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 9.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 10.
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“presumption of ownership or the discharge of a debt.”38 In contrast, civil law
proponents sought to leave good faith out of 30-year prescription entirely and
require it only at the commencement of 10-to-20-year prescription.39 The state
of Spanish law regarding acquisitive prescription was similar to precodification French Law in that multiple modes of prescription were
recognized,40 leading in turn to scholastic debates over the ultimate purpose
of acquisitive prescription.41
The most important point for this Article’s purposes is that the choice
between a unitary system, in which only good-faith acquisitive prescription is
allowed, and a two-tier system, in which both good- and bad-faith acquisitive
prescription are permitted, was clearly apparent to the French jurists on the
eve of French codification and thereafter.42 Moreover, commentators like
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier clearly sympathized with the Romanist
approach and rejected the canon law view. They regarded a good-faith
requirement as an anachronistic relic of a more violent feudal era,43 one that

38. Id.
39. Id. By contrast, canon law insisted that there be good faith throughout the
entire period of possession. Id.
40. For example, Las Siete Partidas acknowledged the existence of both
good- and bad-faith acquisitive prescription with respect to immovables. 1 THE
LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 382 (L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carlton trans.
1978) (1820) (providing for 10- and 20-year prescription of “things immoveable
and incorporeal” for possessors “in good faith, either by purchase, or exchange or
as a donation or legacy, or by any other just title”); id. at 384–85 (providing “[i]f
a man have continued possession of a thing during thirty years or more, no matter
how he obtained it; and no suit be brought against him for it, during the whole of
that time, he will acquire it by prescription”).
41. See also JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 142–44
(2006) (discussing work of 17th-century Dutch and Spanish scholars known as
the “late scholastics” who, following Aquinas, attempted to rationalize the
existence of bad-faith acquisitive prescription).
42. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 17, at 7 (noting
that within Roman law one could find “the two institutions which we shall again
find in the Civil code in the form of acquisitive prescription of immovables: the
prescription of ten-to-twenty years with just title and good faith; and the
prescription by thirty years”).
43. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 19, at 11.
Although it conforms better with morality, a doctrine requiring good
faith in an absolute manner, is a source of difficulty in practice. There
was possibly a reason for it during the feudal era when plunder must have
been frequent. But under normal conditions it does not seem to be the
rule of law which should prevail.
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introduced too many “artificial pretexts” and special interest protections into
a socially beneficial institution.44
2. French Codification and Subsequent French Commentary
Justifying Acquisitive Prescription
The promulgation of the Code Civil in 1804 resolved the debate in
France over the extent and purposes of acquisitive prescription. Rather
than limit acquisitive prescription to good-faith possessors,45 the Code
Civil provided a general 30-year acquisitive prescription available to any
possessor, regardless of his bona fides or mala fides.46 Planiol emphasized
that this 30-year acquisitive prescription represented “the general rule in
matters of acquisitive prescription,” while the “abridged prescription” of 10
to 20 years was “an exception.”47 For Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, this
broad understanding of acquisitive prescription was an article of faith.48
The classic French commentators still revered in Louisiana today
generally justified acquisitive prescription in similar terms. To start, all
observed that acquisitive prescription is necessary to promote certainty and
stability in ownership, particularly when it comes to long-term possessors

44. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 19, at 10–11.
45. The Code Civil did provide a 10-to-20-year prescriptive period for goodfaith possessors with just title in article 2265. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE]
art. 2265 (Fr.) (Barrister of the Inner Temple trans. 1824) (1804).
46. Id. art. 2262. “All actions, as well real as personal, are prescribed by thirty
years, without compelling the party who alleges it to produce a document thereon,
or without permitting an objection to be opposed to him derived from bad faith.”
Id. According to Aubry and Rau, the reference to “bad faith” in the last clause of
article 2262, combined with article 690, which provided for acquisitive
prescription of apparent and continuous servitudes without just title or good faith,
meant that 30-year acquisitive prescription provided not just a defense to a claim
for restitution by the “legitimate owner,” but also “a means to acquire ownership.”
AUBRY & RAU, 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS: DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 216 (Paul
Esmein ed., 7th ed. 1966). See also C. CIV. art. 690 (Fr.).
47. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 574 (La. St. L. Inst.
trans., 12th ed. 1959) (1939).
48. As they put it:
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership as a result of
a lawful possession over a certain period of time. Thus if I enter into
possession of land belonging to my neighbor and hold it thirty years as
if it were mine, the fact of my possession will become a legal title at the
end of this period. If the former owner then claims his property, I can
plead prescription and he will lose.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 25, at 15.
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who possess by virtue of some title or conveyance. Such possessors, they
noted, would otherwise have to prove a perfect chain of title back to some
original grant from the sovereign, a burden that can often be difficult, if
not impossible, to meet, whenever they were challenged by a purported
record owner relying on a more ancient title or conveyance. 49 From this
perspective, acquisitive prescription provides an efficient and fair method
for this presumably innocent or good faith, long-term possessor to
establish ownership and beat back an apparently predatory claim based on
an ancient instrument. It is efficient because the evidence of possession
would presumably be more readily accessible than incomplete or old title
records. It is also fair, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier suggested, because
community acquiescence to the long-term possession must mean that the
possessor has some legitimate foundation for the possession.50 In general,
then, acquisitive prescription serves the valuable social purpose of
aligning title with long-term possession.
Second, focusing on 30-year acquisitive prescription in particular,
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier justified “[the] spoliation of the owner”
on the owner’s own “gross negligence” in failing to protect the right and
on the likelihood that the owner’s “long silence” will lead the possessor to
conclude, with justification, that the owner has “renounced his right.”51
Planiol similarly justified bad-faith acquisitive prescription by citing the
record owner’s “negligence” in failing to perform acts of possession or
otherwise protect the title.52 Further emphasizing the adverse possessor’s
perspective and anticipating modern reliance interest theories,53 BaudryLacantinerie and Tissier also justified the transfer of title based on the
natural rights of the bad-faith possessor “who through thirty uninterrupted
years of work, activity, and, perhaps, worry, has sufficiently expiated the
violation of an unclaimed right” and thus deserves some form of
“amnesty.”54
Finally, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier also justified acquisitive
prescription from an even broader, societal perspective by suggesting that
the institution preserves social peace and social order. As a safety valve
would, acquisitive prescription alleviates the social pressure and
temptation for possessors to engage in acts of self-help or even violence
that could otherwise result from strict enforcement of property rights
49. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 46, at 320; PLANIOL, supra note 47, at 571–
72; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 27–29, at 16–19.
50. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 27, at 17 (citing Domat).
51. Id. § 28, at 17–18.
52. PLANIOL, supra note 47, at 571–72.
53. See discussion infra at notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
54. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 28, at 18.
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existing in paper titles only.55 Here, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier
anticipate a modern strain of property theory that accounts for why, in the
United States at least, adverse possession played an important role in
resolving social tension on the American frontier in the 19th century.56 In
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier’s final utilitarian calculus, the collective
benefits favoring “social interest” served by acquisitive prescription
clearly outweigh the demoralization costs that the institution might inflict
on a few passive record owners.57
B. The Concept of Precarious Possession in Roman and French Law
The term “precarious possession” also emerged from Roman law. A
Roman precarium was a specialized contract in which an owner allowed
another person to possess or enjoy a thing on the condition that it would
be returned at the owner’s demand.58 The notion that precarious possession
has its origins in a contractual relationship is an important one, especially
in cases involving certain express contractual relationships and even in cases
in which the relationship between the parties emerges from an implied or
tacit contractual relationship.59
For Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, however, the concept of
precarious possession in Roman law was still quite narrow: “[I]t qualified
the possession of a person who received the thing with the authorization to
use it, but with the duty to return it to the owner at his first request.”60
Further, the holder precario in Roman law “was the possessor of the thing
with respect to everyone except the person from whom he obtained it”; that
is, the holder’s precarious possession was only a relative vice.61 Other
persons holding for another, such as lessees or usufructuaries, whose rights
of possession were not freely revocable and who did not owe a duty to
return the thing to the owner on demand, would logically not be precarious

55. Id. ¶ 29, at 18–19.
56. See EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY
OUTLAWS 55–63 (2010); see also discussion infra note 134 and accompanying text.
57. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 28, at 17–18.
58. A. N. Yiannopoulous, Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 552 (1991). See
also NICHOLAS, supra note 30, at 151 (referring to the status of creditor holding
collateral pursuant to a security contract as “precario”).
59. See infra Part II.
60. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 267, at 142 (emphasis
added).
61. Id.
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possessors in this narrow sense.62 The glossators and canonists, however,
are responsible for our current understanding of the term because they
broadened the expression “precarious possessor” to refer to “all who
possess for another and recognize a higher title.”63
The concept of precarious possession was eventually codified in
articles 2230 to 2232 and article 2236 of the French Civil Code of 1804,64
and these articles in turn generated significant academic commentary.
Four crucial ideas emerge from that commentary.
1. True Possession Equals Detention Supplemented by Animus
The first idea is commonplace. Possession in the true legal sense—the
type of possession necessary for acquisitive prescription, that merits
protection through a possessory action, and that generates any of the other
derivative benefits of possession—depends on two crucial, but distinct,
elements.65 The person claiming to be a possessor must have physical
control of the thing, commonly referred to as “detention” or corpus, and
the intent to possess as owner—that is, animus domini—or, to use the
felicitous phrase that Professor Lee Hargrave gave us, the intent to possess
“in the manner an owner would possess.”66 In short, a true possessor must
have detention and the intent to possess as if the possessor were the owner
or was on the way to becoming an owner.67 To this day, Louisiana law
mirrors this understanding.68
62. Id. (“Those holding for another were not considered precarious possessors
in Roman law. Their status was defined by other expressions . . . .”).
63. Id.
64. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2230−2232, 2236 (John H. Crabb,
trans., revised ed. 1995) (1804) (Fr.).
65. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 197, at 106 (stating
that the definition of possession under article 2228 of the Code Napoleon applies
only to those who have “animus domini”—the intent to “hold the thing as
owners”—as well as “simple detention”).
66. Lee Hargrave, Ruminations on the Revision of the Louisiana Law of
Acquisitive Prescription and Possession, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1215 (1999)
[hereinafter Ruminations].
67. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier point out that that the definition of
possession as “the detention of a thing by ourselves or through another person who
holds it in our name” comes from Pothier. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra
note 1, ¶ 194, at 105 (emphasis added). This definition was the foundation for article
2228 of the Code Civil. Id.
68. Yiannopoulous, supra note 58, at 524−26 (noting that current articles
3421 and 3424 of the Louisiana Civil Code must be read in pari materia to
visualize these two essential elements of possession).

632

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

2. Precarious Possession Cannot Produce Acquisitive Prescription
The second essential idea depends directly on the first and remains
uncontroversial. Precarious possession—possession on behalf of or for
another person—can constitute only a form of detention and, therefore,
cannot lead to acquisitive prescription on behalf of the precarious
possessor.69 The reason precarious possession suffers from this disability
is that the precarious possessor is not possessing as the master of the thing;
that is, the precarious possessor is not usurping the prerogative and control
of the true owner.70 To paraphrase the words of contemporary Canadian
property law scholar Larissa Katz, the possession of a precarious possessor
does not count because it does not challenge the agenda-setting authority
of the owner with sufficient rigor or clarity.71 By contrast, a bad-faith
possessor, a “usurper of land” who “knows that the thing belongs to
another” and who is not possessing precariously on behalf of or with the
permission of an owner, still can, according to Baudry-Lacantinerie and
Tissier, possess with “an animus domini, for he pretends to be the owner
and acts as if he were.”72
3. Initial Presumption in Favor of Possession as Owner
A third crucial idea to emerge from the French commentators, and in
particular from Baudry-Lacantinere and Tissier, is especially important for
this Article’s consideration of recent Louisiana cases. When a dispute
arises between a record owner and a possessor–claimant, a court should
initially presume that the claimant is possessing with the intent to become
owner or possessing in the manner of an owner, unless the possession
clearly began in a role that evidences the permissive, non-usurping
character of a mere detainer or precarious possessor.73 The crucial text for

69. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 198, at 107 (noting
that article 2236 of the Code Napoleon provides that precarious possessors can
never prescribe, regardless of the length of time of their detention).
70. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier often reiterated this point in vivid terms.
See, e.g., id. (“[s]imple holding” may give rise to certain rights but does not
constitute a “genuine possession”).
71. Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty
and Revolution in Property Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47 (2010).
72. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 265, at 141.
73. Id. ¶¶ 270–272, at 143–44.
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Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier is article 2230 of the Code Civil,74 an
article that earned wild praise from the late nineteenth century German
jurist Rudolf von Jhering, who considered it one of “the best and most
felicitous” in French legislation,75 and that still serves as a direct analogue
and source of current article 3427 of the Louisiana Civil Code.76
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier acknowledge that the presumption that
a possessor intends to possess as owner—or what they call the “presumption
of non-precariousness in favor of all possessors”—can be destroyed by
contrary evidence, such as proof of a title that makes the possession
precarious,”77 or by a showing that the possession is “equivocal.”78 They also
admit the competing influence of the presumption of continued precarious
possession found in article 2231 of the Code Civil,79 the source of current
article 3438 of the Louisiana Civil Code. For precarious possession to cease,
74. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2230 (John H. Crabb, trans., revised
ed. 1995) (1804) (Fr.) (“One is always presumed to possess for oneself, and as
owner, if it is not proved that one commenced to possess for another.”).
75. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 270, at 143. This article
was, according to Jhering, “superior to anything the doctrine has produced in our
whole century with regard to the distinction between possession and detention.” Id.
at 143−44.
76. Current article 3427 reproduces the substance of article 3488 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 cmt. a (2016); see LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3488 (Benjamin W. Dart. ed. 1947) (1870) (“As to the fact itself of
possession, a person is presumed to have possessed as master and owner, unless it
appears that the possession began in the name of and for another.”). Article 3488
was based on article 3454 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, which was identical
except that the word “owner” read “proprietor.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3454 (1825).
The original codal source in Louisiana, article 39 of the Digest of 1808, read:
A person is presumed to have possessed as master and proprietor, unless it
appears that such possession began in the name of and for another, in
which case the law supposes that the possession must have been continued
for and in the name of said person, unless the contrary be shown.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3488 (1870) (Bejamin W. Dart ed. 1947) (citing C. CIV. art.
2230 (Fr.) (1804)). Batiza concurred and also cited Article 12, Title XX, Book III
of the Projet du Gouvernement as a source. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 132
(1971). The revision comments to current article 3427 take the same position. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3427 cmt. c.
77. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 271, at 144.
78. Id.
79. To explain this second presumption, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier turn
to Bigot-Preamenau who explained that “[a] person who holds for another continues
and renews at every instant the possession of the person for whom he holds.” Id. ¶
272, at 144.
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the French Civil Code required an “interversion,” some act by the owner or
by a third party that changed the status of the possession.80 Current Louisiana
law basically continues this approach, although it allows the precarious
possessor somewhat wider scope to terminate the vice of precariousness by
communicating new intentions through “overt and unambiguous acts
sufficient to give notice” if the precarious possessor is a co-owner or
through “actual notice” if the precarious possessor is any other kind of
precarious possessor.81
4. Limited Juridical Effect of Acts Governed by Article 2232 of Code
Civil
The fourth crucial idea to emerge from the Code Civil and our French
doctrinal sources finds expression in article 2232 of that code: “[a]cts of
pure convenience and those of mere tolerance may establish neither
possession nor prescription.”82 This Article refers to two categories of
detention not exhibited by classic precarious possessors, such as lessees,
depositaries, or usufructuaries. Because these acts of detention are too
insignificant, too equivocal, or too harmless to be truly adverse to owners,
the Code Civil implies that true owners must be tolerating such acts and
therefore the acts are incapable of leading to acquisitive prescription. This
important idea survived as an express rule of the Louisiana Civil Code until
1982,83 when it was omitted in the most recent revision of the chapters

80. Id. ¶ 273, at 144. See also id. ¶ 322, at 170−71 (noting that the “vice of
precariousness is in principle indelible” in the sense that “the possessor can not
eliminate it through his own will,” and thus it can only cease if “the conditions
provided by Art. 2238 materialize”); id. ¶¶ 328–36, at 173−77 (elaborating on the
various means by which precarious possession can be interverted).
81. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3439, 3478.
82. C. CIV. 2232 (Fr.) (1804), as translated in BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE &
TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 274, at 145. Another translation of the article states: “Acts
of pure license and simple toleration can lay no foundation either for possession
or prescription.” C. CIV. art. 2232 (Barrister of the Inner Temple trans., 1804)
(Fr.). In French, the article provides: “Les actes de pure faculté et ceux de simple
tolérance ne peuvent fonder ni possession ni prescription.” C. CIV. art. 2232 (Fr.).
83. Article 3490 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided:
The circumstance of having been in possession by the permission or
through the indulgence of another person, gives neither legal possession
nor the right of prescribing.
Thus, those who possess precariously, that is, by having prayed the
master to let them have the possession, do not deprive him thereof, but,
possessing by his consent, they possess for him.
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addressing possession and acquisitive prescription. Of course, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Boudreaux resurrected this idea when the Court confronted
a classic dispute between neighbors rather than a dispute between strangers or
between an owner and someone possessing by virtue of a contractual or legal
status relationship, such as a lessee or usufructuary.84
a. Pure Facultative Acts
The first category of ineffective acts referenced in article 2232—acts
of pure “convenience,” “license,” or “faculty,” that is, “facultative acts”—
needs little discussion because this particular notion did not cross into the
Louisiana Civil Code.85 The only important point about “acts of pure
convenience” is that they cannot lead to prescription because the actor is
not acting in the manner of a “ master” and no outward sign indicates that
“two rights [are] in conflict.”86
b. Acts of Simple Tolerance
The second category of acts referenced by article 2232, acts of simple
tolerance, is more important because it resurfaced prominently in Boudreaux,87
and might arise in any other typical neighbor dispute. Examples of acts of
simple tolerance noted by Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier include entering a
Article 3456 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 and article 40 of the Digest of
1808 contained identical language, with only slight variation in punctuation.
84. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 562−63 (La. 2015).
85. According to Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, “facultative acts” can be
understood as acts that an owner undertakes on his own property that may affect
another owner’s enjoyment of that owner’s property, but that do not lead to the
acquisition of any prescriptive rights. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra
note 1, ¶¶ 277–278, at 146–48. Admittedly, this statement sounds circular, but an
example clarifies the idea. Presume owner A makes an opening in a wall that he
owns and that happens to be contiguous to an adjacent estate owned by B and
presume that the opening exists for 30 years. Id. This “facultative” act does not
mean that owner A can prevent owner B from erecting a construction or planting
a tree that might block the view out of the opening. Id. ¶ 277, at 146. A facultative
act of this nature, which is “only an exercise of faculties given by the statutes, or
a normal exercise of ownership rights,” cannot lead to acquisitive prescription
because it does not diminish the rights of another owner, even if the other owner is
passive for a long period. Id. ¶ 278, at 146. The rule in article 2232 regarding
facultative acts can also be understood as a restatement of the principle that negative
servitudes cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Id. ¶ 278, at 147.
86. Id. ¶ 281, at 148.
87. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562–63.
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neighbor’s land to draw water from a well or to pick mushrooms from a
forest.88 Although these acts represent more of “[an] encroachment” upon
or challenge to the owner’s right to control the property than acts of pure
convenience,89 they still do not lead to prescription because they do not
cause any “appreciable damage to the other” and are not “sufficiently
serious to represent a usurpation which should be repressed.”90 More
importantly, these acts of simple tolerance are equated with “precarious
concession” out of a need to coordinate social interaction.91 If owners were
required to suppress them out of fear that prescription might start to run,
“[g]ood neighborly relations would thus be upset.”92 Such acts of “simple
toleration” can turn into acts of possession sufficient to lead to prescription
if, as suggested in article 2238 of the Code Civil, some kind of
“interversion in fact” occurs.93 But, absent such an interversion, the person
who engages in acts of mere tolerance is more like a fiduciary with respect
to the true owner. To terminate the possessor’s precariousness, this kind
of possessor must clearly signal an intent to challenge the owner’s
authority.94
C. Louisiana Commentary After the 1982 Revision of the Civil Code
In 1982, the Louisiana legislature enacted five revised chapters of the
Civil Code to address occupancy, possession, and acquisitive prescription.95
In addition to creating a more systematic and terse statement of this body of
88. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 282, at 149.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Baudry-Lacantiner and Tissier also provide this vivid example from
French case law: a landowner allows a community to host a harvest festival on his
land every year for more than 30 years. Id. Despite a plea of prescription, the
landowner can stop the festival because the owner simply tolerated the use. Id.
The community’s use of land was in its interest, but also in the landowner’s
interest because the excrements deposited by animals fertilized his field. Id. These
principles also reinforced the French Civil Code’s prohibition against acquisitive
prescription of discontinuous servitudes. Id. Acts of quasi-possession that might
be sufficient to establish exercise of an existing conventional servitude are not,
from the perspective of a landowner, a substantial encroachment because they can
also be explained as acts of simple tolerance. Id. ¶ 283, at 150.
93. For example, if a non-riparian landowner built exterior works across a
riparian neighbor’s land to carry water to the non-riparian’s own estate for
purposes of irrigation, this action might suffice. Id. ¶ 2861, at 151.
94. Katz, supra note 71, at 67.
95. 1982 La. Acts No. 187 (adopting LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3412−3491).
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law, the 1982 revision specifically clarified that the Civil Code rules
regarding the attributes, vices, and tacking of possession apply not only in
the context of acquisitive prescription, but also to the protection of
possession in its own right.96 In the specific context of precarious
possession, the revision succeeded in streamlining and consolidating many
articles from the old law97 and made one substantive change: for the first
time, Louisiana law clearly permitted a precarious possessor, “such as a
lessee or depositary,” to bring a possessory action “against anyone except
the person for whom he possesses.”98
Soon after the revision came into effect, commentators began to point
out problems. Professor Symeonides, for example, noted that the revised
Civil Code articles addressing the means by which precarious possessors
can terminate their precariousness create needless confusion.99 At the same
time, Professor Lee Hargrave began to warn that revised articles 3427 and
3438, which contain the two central presumptions governing possession

96. Symeon Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of
Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA. L. REV. 69, 70−72 (1983).
97. Under the 1870 Civil Code, articles dealing with precarious possession
were found in the chapter on possession in the subsection on ten-year acquisitive
prescription and in the subsection on causes preventing acquisitive prescription,
but under the revision, they appear primarily in the chapter on possession, LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 3428−3429, 3437−2440 (2007), and in the title on prescription,
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3477−2479 (2011). Symeonides, supra note 96, at 82 n.33.
98. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3440 (2007). This change effectively overrules article
3656 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and brings Louisiana up to date
with the modern approach taken in France and other civil law jurisdictions. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3440 cmt. b−c (2007). See also C. CIV. arts. 2282−2283 (Fr.)
(added in 1975). For more commentary and the view that “the granting of the
possessory action to the lessee is really a specious gift,” see Symeonides, supra
note 96, at 91 n.41.
99. Although the new rules set forth in articles 3439 and 3478 of the Civil
Code confirmed pre-revision jurisprudence in some ways, Symeonides warned
that the revision had created a needless, and perhaps illogical, distinction by
allowing co-owners to terminate precarious possession through “overt and
unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice,” while all other precarious possessors
had to demonstrate “actual notice” of their intent to possess as owners. If any
distinction was warranted, he noted, the “less exacting standard” should have been
imposed on co-owners because they are less likely to arouse suspicion than other
precarious possessors such as lessees. Symeonides, supra note 96, at 87 n.38.
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and precarious possession, were “circular”100 and “redundant,”101
respectively. Missing from the revised Civil Code, Hargrave argued, was
a clear statement of what he described as the “core rule,” which he stated
in the following terms:
The person alleging the precariousness of another’s possession
has the burden of proving that fact. Proof that the possessor
possessed for another discharges that burden. Once a precarious
possession is established, the burden shifts to the precarious
possessor who must then prove that he meets the requirements of
Article 3439.102
A dozen years later, Hargrave returned to these subjects and suggested
that recent judicial decisions threatened to incorporate a requirement that
possessors have a subjective belief that they are owners of the property
they are possessing to be legitimate possessors.103 Hargrave disagreed with
this approach because the Louisiana Civil Code, just like the Code Civil,
clearly contemplates that legal possessors can, in fact, be in bad faith; that
is, they “can know subjectively [they do] not own the thing.”104 All that
the Civil Code actually requires, according to Hargrave, is that the
possessor “must intend to possess in the manner an owner would
possess.”105 In other words, the requirement of an intent to possess as
owner must be interpreted objectively, in a manner that focuses not on
what is taking place in the mind of the possessor, but rather on the “style
of possessing.”106 When determining a possessor’s intentions, Hargrave

100. Lee Hargrave, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Louisiana Property
Law, 46 LA. L. REV. 225, 236 (1985) [hereinafter Presumptions]. With respect to
the presumption found in article 3427 stating that a possessor is presumed to
possess as owner “unless he [the possessor] began to possess in the name of and
for another,” Hargrave observed that “possession for another is the same thing
that should be proved to disprove possessing as owner.” Id.
101. Id. at 237. The sole purpose of article 3438, Hargrave noted, was to open
the door to application of the objective standards found in article 3439 for
providing notice to the true owner of a precarious possessor’s newly formed
acquisitive intentions. Id. at 236. Thus, article 3438 merely restates a rule of
substantive law and does not truly provide a new presumption. Id.
102. Presumptions, supra note 100, at 237.
103. Ruminations, supra note 66.
104. Id. at 1215−16.
105. Id. at 1215.
106. Id. Hargrave located ample statutory authority for his objective approach to
the question of intent to possess. In particular, he cited LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3660
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contended, a court should look at “circumstances” and “objective acts” to
make reasonable inferences107 and should be careful to employ a “flexible
definition of possessing as owner as not to defeat [the] institution” of 30year acquisitive prescription and “the reliance interests it protects.”108
Hargrave’s primary example of the problematic judicial slide into
subjectivity was the decision in Levy v. Germania Plantation.109 In this
case, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that a possessor,
who had physically occupied and used vacant farmland and woodland for
more than 60 years but did not know the identity of the land’s true owner
and did not pay rent to use the land, was nevertheless a precarious
possessor because he realized only that he might have a claim to the land
when a land man asked him to execute oil and gas leases.110 The holding
in Levy, Hargrave warned, “virtually reads the concept of bad-faith
possession out of the code and penalizes a layman for lack of knowledge
of legal concepts.”111 In addition, it also misidentified the crucial question:
“The issue was not whether [the possessor–claimant] thought he was
owner, but whether he intended to possess as an owner would, that is, for
himself rather than for another.”112 Hargrave’s discussion of Levy is now
eerily prescient in light of the uncertainty created by Boudreaux v.
Cummings.113

(1998), stating that a possessor is a person who “possesses for himself, whether in
good or bad faith, or even as usurper.” Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1216.
107. Id. at 1216.
108. Id. at 1217.
109. 395 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
110. Id. at 371. This admission, the court held, rebutted the “strong
presumption under our law” that a possessor intends to possess for himself as
owner, even though the claimant was “possessing the property in the same manner
as he would have if he had had record title.” Id.
111. Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1217.
112. Id. The court in Levy was apparently aware that it was treading on thin
ice. Absent the claimant’s candor, the court noted, “his claim was in perfect
posture for him to reap the benefits of the presumption which our law grants unto
a possessor.” Levy, 395 So. 2d at 371. The court in Levy also relied in part on
Humble v. Dewey, a decision that Hargrave called “equally erroneous.”
Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1217 n.177 (citing Humble v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d
278, 382−83 (La. Ct. App. 1968)).
113. 167 So. 3d 559, 565 (La. 2015).
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D. The Virtues of Louisiana’s Two-Tier Model of Acquisitive
Prescription
Before moving on to a detailed consideration of Boudreaux and other
Louisiana jurisprudence addressing the problem of precarious possession, this
Article briefly pauses to reflect on the virtues of Louisiana’s two-tier
institution of acquisitive prescription. These virtues are important to note not
only because of Justice Knoll’s warning that the majority opinion in
Boudreaux threatens to undermine the entire institution of acquisitive
prescription in Louisiana,114 but also because adverse possession, acquisitive
prescription’s common law twin, has been subjected to criticism in some
American law reviews115 and has recently been modified by a few state
legislatures.116
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Carol N. Brown & Serena M. Williams, Rethinking Adverse
Possession: An Essay on Ownership and Possession, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583
(2010) (contending that adverse possession should be abrogated on fairness and
efficiency grounds); Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad
Faith” Acquisitive Prescription, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037 (2006) (arguing that
only bad-faith possessors should be allowed to gain title and they should be
required to document their intent to acquire ownership through an offer to
purchase or by recording or registering notice of their aggressive intentions);
Jeffery Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419
(2001) (critiquing many of the traditional rationales offered in support of adverse
possession); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994) (arguing that U.S. adverse possession law leads to
exploitation and destruction of wild lands and wilderness, and therefore adverse
possession should not be applicable to wild lands).
116. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-101(3)(b)(II) (West 2016)
(amended 2008) (allowing adverse possession only if adverse possessors “had a
good faith belief [that they] w[ere] the actual owner of the property and the belief
was reasonable under the particular circumstances”); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW
§ 501(3) (McKinney 2016) (amended 2008) (requiring adverse possession
claimant to show “a reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs to the
adverse possessor”); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.45.052 (West 2016) (amended
2003) (providing that in border cases, adverse possessors can prevail only if they
have “a good faith but mistaken belief” that the property lay within the borders of
their own land). New York also appears to have drastically curtailed adverse
possession in border cases involving encroachments by enacting a conclusive
presumption that all occupations of an adjoining property owner’s land are
“permissive” unless the encroachments involve substantial structures. N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS LAW § 543. For criticism of these developments, see Joseph W.
Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1398
(2013).
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First, Louisiana’s two-tier structure, in which ownership and other real
rights in immovables can be acquired if the claimant proves ten years of
continuous possession plus just title and good faith at the commencement
of possession, or 30 years of possession with neither just title nor good
faith, satisfies the crucial utilitarian ends of a “limitations model” of
adverse possession.117 Just like the French doctrinal commentators whose
justifications for acquisitive prescription were outlined in Part I.A.2, 118
many American property scholars have suggested that adverse possession
is valuable because it too provides repose, clears title, and promotes
certainty for long-term possessors.119
Several variations of this limitations justification for adverse
possession exist. In one version, adverse possession improves the
efficiency and reliability of the judicial process by quickly disposing of
claims based on lost, unreliable, or stale titles and potentially unreliable
testimony about events in the distant past.120 Another version of this
quieting title rationale focuses on how the institution protects a long-term
possessor who possesses by virtue of some title or conveyance and who,
when threatened by a person relying on an older instrument or conveyance,
would otherwise have to prove a perfect chain of title back to the
sovereign.121 Finally, a third version of the limitations rationale focuses on
how adverse possession serves the interests of third parties and the
property marketplace in general by providing an efficient and practical
alternative to expensive title examinations or title insurance.122
Some scholars have criticized the assumptions underlying these
limitations rationales by noting the availability of alternative tools for
quieting title—in particular marketable title acts and title insurance—and
117. Sprankling coined the term “limitations model” to describe a cluster of
rationales for adverse possession. Sprankling, supra note 115, at 819.
118. See discussion supra notes 45–57 and accompanying text.
119. Sprankling observed that generally American property law views adverse
possession as a “specialized application of the statute of limitations” that simply
bars a suit by the disposed landowner to eject the adverse claimant. Sprankling,
supra note 115, at 818. This dominant view, he claimed, is rooted in the same
policies underlying any statute of limitations: “avoiding ‘stale claims’ and
allowing repose.” Id. at 819. Other scholars have made similar arguments. See
Henry Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918);
Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1128−30 (1985) (articulating a cluster of rationales that
generally relate to the limitations oriented goal of promoting legal certainty by
quieting titles).
120. See Merrill, supra note 119, at 1128.
121. Id.
122. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 155 (1988).
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by pointing to the growing reliability of recording systems, land registries, and
modern surveying techniques.123 Nevertheless, the limitations model still has
important adherents among common law scholars, particularly those who
emphasize its ability to reduce transaction costs and promote efficiency.124 In
a similar fashion, Louisiana’s ten-year acquisitive prescription regime
promotes legal certainty for good-faith possessors who have relied on a just
title to fend off spurious claims based on old titles or brought by short-term
possessors who may have seized possession coercively.125 Louisiana’s 30year acquisitive prescription regime also protects the interests of possessors
who, for any number of sometimes understandable reasons, may not be able
to prove good faith or just title, but who nevertheless have justifiable reliance
interests based on their long-term possession of land.
Second, Louisiana’s two-tier structure of acquisitive prescription
responds to the moral concerns raised by critics of “bad-faith adverse
possession” and by advocates of a narrower “administrative model” of
adverse possession who believe these doctrines should be limited to helping
or at least favoring reasonable, good-faith possessors who would otherwise be
harmed by innocent conveyancing mistakes.126 Louisiana’s system responds
123. See Fennell, supra note 115, at 1063−64 (pointing to marketable title acts
and title insurance); Stake, supra note 115, at 2441−49 (stressing that marketable
title acts are a superior tool for quieting title, arguing that betterment acts can
protect innocent encroachers, noting the increasing accuracy and inexpensiveness
of surveys, and suggesting that “elimination of adverse possession would lead to
even more careful recording of transactions”).
124. See Merrill, supra note 119, at 1129 (observing that even in an idealized
world of universal and perfectly accurate recording systems and indestructible,
perfectly measured property boundaries, adverse possession would be still be
useful to third parties seeking to engage in property transactions because titles
could still be clogged by old, outdated property interests, which would all have to
be traced to their current successors before releases could be obtained and that
this practice could lead to more exhausting title examinations, more negotiation
and payoffs, and more expensive title insurance premiums).
125. See Douglas Nichols, Comment, The Publician Action, 69 TUL. L. REV. 217
(1994) (discussing the difficult burden of proof facing a record owner bringing a
petitory action against a party in possession created by Pure Oil v. Skinner, 294 So.
2d 797 (La. 1974)); see also Baker v. Romero, 55 So. 3d 1035 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
126. See Merrill, supra note 119, at 1134, 1145−53 (arguing that property
law’s interest in “punishing or deterring those who engage in purely coercive
transfers of property” justifies a change in the law whereby owners who lose title
to their land through adverse possession to “bad faith” possessors would have a
right to seek just compensation for the value of the land lost at the time the
claimant’s adverse possession began); Helmholz, supra note 26 (arguing that
American courts routinely favor good-faith possessors over bad-faith possessors).
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to these concerns by giving possessors who can demonstrate both an
objectively reasonable belief that they own the land they are possessing
and a just title describing all of the property in dispute a substantially
shorter prescriptive period to endure before their possession ripens into
ownership of other real rights. At the same time, by utilizing a much longer
prescriptive period—30 years, an entire generation—for possessors who
cannot meet either of these requirements, Louisiana’s system respects the
moral objections that acquisitive prescription might transfer title too easily
to possessors who either intentionally possess land they know they do not
own or at least possess it carelessly.127 Also noteworthy is that by
transferring title to either kind of possessor at the end of the respective
prescriptive period without any compensation to the record owner,
Louisiana’s system also avoids the complicated and perhaps intractable
problem of determining just compensation that a liability rule approach to
adverse possession would entail, regardless of whether such an approach
applied to only bad-faith acquisitive prescription or to both forms.128
Third, just as Planiol and Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier observed in
France,129 Louisiana’s acquisitive prescription fulfills the objectives
associated with what American scholars call the “development model” of
adverse possession.130 It does so by shifting title from a passive or even a
negligent record owner, who has failed to put his property to productive
use or to monitor the property, to the industrious or diligent possessor, who
127. See Fennell, supra note 115, at 1048−49 (summarizing the moral disapproval
showered on “bad faith possessors”).
128. Richard Epstein made precisely this point in assessing Merrill’s proposal
to convert the remedial structure of adverse possession from a universal “property
rule” mechanism to a “liability rule” mechanism for bad-faith adverse possessors.
Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 685−89 (1986). In Epstein’s view, a longer
statute of limitations for bad-faith possessors would satisfy moral qualms about
allowing adverse possession to benefit land thieves too easily, but it would still
serve the instrumental objectives of quieting title and promoting legal certainty.
Id. at 686−89. Epstein disapproved of Merrill’s liability rule solution to the
dilemma of bad-faith adverse possession because liability rules that require courts
to determine the objective value of property are “costly to administer and undercut
the security of transactions concern that lies at the base of the [adverse possession]
rule.” Id. at 689.
129. See discussion supra notes 51−54 and accompanying text.
130. Sprankling, supra note 115, at 816. Sprankling argued that over the
course of the 19th and 20th centuries, American courts transformed adverse
possession from “a mechanism designed to protect the title of the true owner
against false claims into a tool designed to transfer title to wild lands from the
idle true owner to the industrious adverse possessor.” Id. at 821.
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has taken charge of vacant property and often put it to some higher value
use,131 or has at least “set an agenda” for the property and took pains to make
sure that others respect that agenda.132 Also, just as the French doctrinal
writers pointed out a century ago,133 Louisiana’s two-tier structure of
acquisitive prescription still performs the important societal function of
aligning actual title with community expectations and assumptions about
who deserves to be treated as the owner.134
Finally, Louisiana’s two-tier acquisitive prescription regime allows its
property law to honor the powerful psychological and emotional attachments
that possessors can develop with regard to a thing they possess for a long

131. See Fennell, supra note 115, at 1040 (the “niche goal of adverse
possession” is the task of “moving land into the hands of parties who value it
much more highly than do the record owners”); Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1113 (2011) (adverse possession promotes efficient
development by “encouraging careful contracting, reducing land title conflicts,
[and] rewarding productive uses of scarce resources”); Sally Brown Richardson,
Abandonment and Adverse Possession, 52 HOUSTON L. REV. 1386 (2015)
(arguing for relaxation of corporeal possession requirement to allow adverse
possessors to obtain title to abandoned property); COOTER & ULEN, supra note
122 (justifying adverse possession because, inter alia, it specifies “procedures for
a productive user to take title from an unproductive one”); Merrill, supra note
119, at 1130 (referring to this general cluster of rationales as punishing those who
“sleep on their rights” by ignoring their property or otherwise engaging in “poor
custodial practices”); GORDLEY, supra note 41, at 141 (contending that the most
persuasive justification for adverse possession and acquisitive prescription is to
transfer title from an absent, passive owner—from “an owner who has not
behaved like an owner and has not even checked to see how his land is being
used”—to a possessor who is “putting [the land] to use”).
132. See generally Katz, supra note 71, at 67−70 (defending adverse possession
because it identifies objects that are subject to an agenda-setting vacancy and assures
that there is always an individual with “agenda-setting authority” in control of a
thing). Similarly, Gordley suggests that the problem solved by adverse possession
or acquisitive prescription arises when the record owner “has made no such decision
at all” with respect to the property and the owner’s lack of attention “has only
muddled titles.” GORDLEY, supra note 41, at 144.
133. See discussion supra notes 49−56 and accompanying text.
134. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 56, at 55–63 (recounting how the men
and women who settled the American frontier, often without the benefit of formal
title to the land they settled, came to be treated as heroic or at least strategic
adverse possessors who successfully resisted the federal land distribution policies
of the United States government in the first half of the 19th century).
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period of time,135 and to the related reliance interests136 and endowment effect
interests137 that build up in long-term possessors. In short, just as adverse
possession does, acquisitive prescription helps to stabilize Louisiana property
law, but it also preserves the ability to respond flexibly to discrepancies
between long-term possession and paper titles.
135. Drawing on Kant, Hegel, and probably Bentham, Oliver Wendell Holmes
first stated this idea in O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 207 (1881)
(“Possession is to be protected because a man by taking possession of an object
has brought it within the sphere of his will.”), and expanded it in O.W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“A thing which you have
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion,
takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act
and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.”). Margaret Radin
extended Holmes’s idea with her own theory of “property and personhood.”
Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession and Alienation, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 739,
741 (1986) (asserting that a person’s “claim to an owned object grows stronger
as, over time, the holder becomes bound up with the object,” and “[c]onversely,
the claim [of a record owner] to an object grows weaker as the will (or
personhood) is withdrawn”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE LAW 78–79 (7th ed. 2007) (restating Holmes’s theory with an “economic
explanation” cast in terms of Benthamite pleasure and pain).
136. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property Law, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 614, 666–67 (1988); Merrill, supra note 119, at 1131 (also identifying
“the reliance interest” justification for adverse possession and noting at least three
alternative variations). Although he notes that the reliance interest rationale
contradicts “the interest of a T[itle] O[wner] and society generally in preserving
the integrity of the set of entitlements grounded in law,” id. at 1132, Merrill
ultimately endorses the rationale by suggesting a fourth version—the reliance
interests of third parties who have an interest in being able to assume, without
expensive and time-consuming title examinations, that the person who has been
in long term possession of property actually has title to the property. Id. Merrill
calls this the right to rely on the “appearance of title.” Id.
137. Jeffery Stake makes a powerful case for the continuing viability of
adverse possession by updating Holmes’s “roots” rationale and Radin’s
personality theory version through the experimental psychology concept known
as “the endowment effect” and its close cousin “loss-aversion” theory. Stake,
supra note 115. Stake argues that “people become more attached to tangible
physical assets than to financial assets and feel a greater sense of loss when
deprived of tangible physical objects than when deprived of intangibles that have
the same value to a purchaser.” Id. at 2463. Stake sums up his argument for an
endowment effect understanding of adverse possession by observing that many
adverse possession disputes are really contests between two relatively innocent
parties and that when forced to choose which party has to bear a loss, adverse
possession simply and sensibly “choses to deprive R[ecord] O[wner] of his financial
asset rather than deprive A[dverse] P[ossessor] of her tangible asset.” Id. at 2471.
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II. THREE PARADIGMATIC POSSESSION AND ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
DISPUTES: A SOCIAL AND RELATIONAL APPROACH
Multiple property law scholars have suggested that adverse possession
and acquisitive prescription disputes should be viewed from perspectives
other than traditional doctrinal categories. Thirty years ago, Margaret
Radin divided adverse possession cases into three paradigms: “color of
title,” “boundaries,” and “squatters” cases.138 In the first, the possessor
holds an “invalid document of title and eventually has to defend against
the ‘true owner’ or someone claiming under her.”139 In a “boundaries”
case, “the boundary line observed by neighboring property owners in
practice does not correspond with what their documents say,” and
eventually one of the neighbors litigates to address the discrepancy.140
Finally, in a “squatters” case, “aggressive trespassers” take over plots of
ground and treat it as their own.141 Although Radin’s three paradigms hint
at the social relationships between the parties, her categories are primarily
defined by the structure of legal and moral problems confronting courts in
each type of case. Also, Radin generated her paradigms for the limited
purpose of demonstrating why her “personality theory” of property
explained a statutory or judicial preference for good-faith over bad-faith
possessors.142
More recently, James Smith has suggested that an emerging body of
law under the heading of the “law of neighbors” can be understood more
clearly if scholars and courts distinguish between cases in which the
parties are absolute strangers to one another and cases in which the parties
are friends or enjoy some special relationship with each other.143 Smith
argues that application of a “stranger model” and a “friend model” could
help make sense of some of the specialized presumptions and burdens of

138. Radin, supra note 135, at 746.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Without any empirical support, Radin asserted that “color of title” and
“boundaries” cases were much more common than “squatters” cases. Id.
142. Id. at 749. In Radin’s view, it is quite natural that courts and legislators
would favor mistaken good-faith claimants because they develop bonds more
quickly with the land they possess, as they already believe they own it. Following
Hegel, however, Radin acknowledged that even squatters or bad-faith possessors
can, over time, develop strong psychological bonds of their own with the thing
possessed. Id.
143. James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors,
39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 757, 758–60 (2011).
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proof that courts in the United States have developed to deal with problems
of permissive use in adverse possession cases.144
Building on Radin’s and Smith’s paradigms, this Article proposes that
the Louisiana legal community should view its own body of acquisitive
prescription jurisprudence as consisting of three categories of cases. The
first category consists of cases in which the parties are in fact strangers to
one another. Although the nature of a possessor’s claim could grow out of
a conveyance error or confusion over a boundary location or could result
from a more aggressive assertion of dominion, the most salient
characteristic of a “stranger” case is that the parties do not share a
preexisting relationship. Although they may own adjacent tracts of land,
they are not neighbors in the sense of inhabiting neighboring lots or
belonging to the same neighborhood community. In a “stranger” case, the
true owner is often an absentee owner who does not live on or near the
land and does not regularly use or visit the land in dispute. In these cases,
the existing presumptions and burdens of proof found in the Louisiana
Civil Code, despite the infirmities noted by Professor Hargrave, work well
enough and generally produce consistent or stable results. In a “stranger”
case, courts will usually characterize the claimant–possessor as possessing
as owner and only rarely as a precarious possessor.
In the second category of cases, the parties are not strangers, but are
linked to one another by a preexisting contractual relationship or some
special legal status relationship. In these cases, courts classify the possessor–
claimant as a precarious possessor at the outset of the possession. The
crucial question then becomes when, if ever, the precarious possessor has
terminated the precarious possession and begun to possess as owner.
Although the results of these contractual and legal status cases are less
predictable than “stranger” cases, still the presumptions and burdens of
proof provided by Louisiana Civil Code articles 3427, 3438, 3439, and
3478 operate effectively.145 By using these tools and developing some of
their own jurisprudential rules of thumb, Louisiana courts have been able
to produce outcomes that are sensitive to the particular contractual or
social relationship that initially bound the parties together.
The third category of cases involves true neighbors—persons who
actually live near to each other and know one another or at least belong to
the same close-knit community. Despite these neighborly ties, the parties
144. Id. at 760−63. For another example of an insightful contextualized
approach to understanding conflicts in adverse possession law, see Luke Meier, A
Contextual Approach to Claim of Right in Adverse Possession Cases: On Van
Valkenburgh v. Lutz, Bad Faith and Mistaken Boundaries, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 47, 53–54 (2015).
145. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3427, 3438, 3439, 3478 (2016).
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in a neighbor dispute do not have any other preexisting contractual, family,
or legal status relationship. When courts confront this third kind of case,
the outcomes tend to be more unpredictable. In these cases, significant
equitable considerations are in tension with one another. In a neighbor
case, the court will often focus as much on the assumptions and
expectations that the true owner may have reasonably developed based on
the specific nature of the neighbor relationship as on the state of mind and
expectations of the claimant–possessor. It is precisely in these cases that
the existing framework of presumptions provided by articles 3427 and
3438 of the Louisiana Civil Code proves to be the most inadequate. To
remedy this deficiency, Part III of this Article proposes that Louisiana law
would be well served by the development of a new presumption of sharing
and corresponding indicia of giving or renunciation that could help courts
analyze these inherently difficult cases with greater contextual and
relational sensitivity.
A. Strangers
Louisiana courts are most confident in resolving precarious possession
defenses in cases in which the claimant–possessor and record owner are true
strangers to one another, that is, when the person asserting possession in a
possessory action or acquisitive prescription in some other procedural setting
has no relationship at all with the record owner. In some stranger cases, the
claimant–possessor is an opportunistic trespasser, a person who observes that
a parcel of land is unused, unfenced, and not actively monitored by anyone
and begins to engage in active corporeal possession.146 In some stranger cases,
however, claimants may have an honest, though mistaken, belief that they
own the land in dispute but cannot prove a just title describing all of the land
and thus must rely on 30-year, rather than ten-year, acquisitive prescription.147
As this Section will show, in most paradigmatic stranger cases, courts
146. See, e.g., Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La.
1975); Brunson v. Hemmler, 989 So. 2d 246 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Charles Tolmas,
Inc. v. Lee, 903 So. 2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Williams v. McEacharn, 464 So. 2d
20 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 862 So. 2d. 1010 (La. Ct.
App. 2003); St. John Baptist Church of Phoenix v. Thomas, 1 So. 3d 618, 62226 (La.
Ct. App. 2008), all discussed infra notes 153–88 and accompanying text.
147. Many boundary actions, especially in boundary tacking actions arising
under article 794 of the Civil Code, fall into this latter subcategory. See, e.g.,
Loutre Land & Timber Co., 63 So. 3d 120, 122−26 (La. 2011) (holding that
plaintiff timber company was owner of disputed strip of land where both parties
had received a title from same succession but plaintiff could rely on boundary
tacking to claim ownership via thirty year acquisitive prescription).
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apply the foundational presumption set forth in article 3427 of the
Louisiana Civil Code—that “[o]ne is presumed to intend to possess as
owner unless he began to possess in the name of and for another”—in a
robust fashion. In fact, resolution of stranger cases often will turn on other
issues, for example, when the claimant’s possession began or whether it
was afflicted with any of the other vices of possession.
A claimant–possessor will not always prevail in what at first blush
looks like a stranger case. Occasionally, a court will find an apparent
stranger–claimant to be a precarious possessor.148 Sometimes this holding
occurs when a court finds that a claimant, at least at the commencement of
possession, had a contractual or legal status relationship with the record
owner149 and sometimes when the claimant appeared to possess through
the neighborly toleration of the record owner.150 In other words, courts
sometimes reclassify apparent stranger disputes as belonging to one of the
other two categories of possession and acquisitive prescription disputes.
Finally, in a few stranger cases, courts simply misapply the law. Just as
Professor Hargrave warned years ago,151 courts sometimes make the
mistake of classifying claimants as precarious possessors when in fact they
are simply straightforward bad-faith possessors who possess as if they
were the owner because they are on the road to acquisition of ownership
through possession but are not yet the true owners.152
1. Stranger–Claimant Possessed as Owner
In the vast majority of reported possession and acquisitive prescription
decisions in which the parties are actual strangers to one another, Louisiana
courts correctly focus on objective circumstances and routinely find that the
claimant–possessor is possessing as owner and not as a precarious
148. See discussion of cases infra notes 189−202 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
(observing that landowner’s caretaker “gave plaintiff-appellant permission to run
his cattle on the land without payment of rent by Harper if Harper would look
after the property, keep the fire out and the brush down,” thus effectively
classifying the possessor as an implied licensee or agent of the record owner and
thus not a true possessor because of his quasi-contractual relationship).
150. Buckley v. Dumond, 156 So. 784, 788 & 790 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (finding
that neighboring claimant “did not have ‘the intention of possessing as owner’”
and his trapping was a “mere toleration on the part of the plaintiff”), discussed
infra notes 189−90 and accompanying text.
151. Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1217.
152. See, e.g., Levy v. Germania Plantation, Inc., 395 So. 2d 366, 371 (La. Ct.
App. 1981); McCoy v. Toms, 384 So. 2d 518, 519−22 (La. Ct. App. 1980), both
discussed infra notes 198−202 and accompanying text.
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possessor. A classic example of this approach is Liner v. Louisiana Land
and Exploration Co.,153 the 1975 Louisiana Supreme Court decision that
serves as the foundation for our modern understanding of the concept of
the “right to possess” and the requirements for bringing a possessory
action. Although Justice Albert Tate’s rich doctrinal explanation in Liner
of why a possessor’s “right to possess” is not lost as the result of a mere
disturbance-in-fact during the year preceding the assertion of a possessory
action is often considered the case’s focal point,154 the case also represents
a classic example of the unfolding of adverse possession. In particular,
recall that the record owner in Liner, the Louisiana Land & Exploration
Company (“LL&E”), failed to demonstrate any plausible claim that the
possession of Liner or his ancestors-in-possession was precarious.155 In
fact, despite an earlier case involving nearby swampland in which the
claimant was characterized as a precarious possessor,156 the Supreme
Court in Liner held that the Liner family possessed as owners, not as
precarious possessors.157 The reasons behind this holding were several.
Despite holding no record title to the swampy, roughly 3,000 by 7,000
foot tract of marshland in dispute, which was adjacent to a tract the Liners
did own by title, Liner and his ancestors engaged in numerous acts of
possession that revealed “the quality of his [and their] possession was that
of owner.”158 These acts included: occupation of houses prior to 1909;
occupation of a camp for three or four months every year during trapping
season for 56 years; annual farming, cattle raising, and trapping; erecting
fences and later maintaining boundaries with the use of stakes and
markers; the mysterious act of “burning the marsh”; granting a gas
company a pipeline right of way; Oliver’s appropriation of a ditch that
LL&E had constructed on its claimed boundary line so that he could
provide a fresh water source for his own cattle; 159 and, of course, the
famous battle of the stakes, which helped Oliver preserve his right to
possess during the crucial year preceding his filing of the possessory

153. Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975).
154. Id. at 779–83 (Tate, J., concurring).
155. Plainly, LL&E made such an assertion because the majority opinion went out
of its way to hold that “the quality of his [Liner’s] possession was that of owner. . . . It
was neither precarious, clandestine, violent nor ambiguous.” Id. at 774.
156. Buckley v. Dumond, 156 So. 784 (La. Ct. App. 1934), discussed infra
notes 189−90 and accompanying text.
157. Liner, 319 So. 2d at 769.
158. Id. at 774.
159. Id. at 769–70.
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action.160 In light of these actions, Justice Dixon could sum up the nature
of the Liner family’s possession in these terms: “the quality of his
possession was that of owner. It extended to visible boundaries. It was
neither precarious, clandestine, violent, nor ambiguous.”161
Nowhere in the record was there any indication of a real neighbor
relationship between the Liners and the record owners. Although they
owned neighboring tracts of land, they were, for all intents and purposes,
strangers to each other—that is, until LL&E appeared in the year before
the filing of the possessory action and began challenging Liner’s
boundaries.
Although Justice Dixon’s opinion in Liner cited Buckley v. Dumond,162
a case in which the possession of two claimants to neighboring swampland
similar to the land in dispute in Liner was characterized as precarious, Dixon
did not bother to distinguish that case in any detail.163 A quick review reveals
why. First, the claimants’ activities and improvements in Buckley were more
transitory than in Liner.164 Second, the record owner in Buckley maintained
his presence on the land in dispute through the actions of a hunting and
trapping lessee.165 The active presence of this lessee, who posted the
property with signs forbidding entrance and actively tried to keep intruders
away, suggests that the court in Buckley visualized the parties as two
neighbors, with the defendant–claimant engaged in trapping through the
“mere tolerance” of the record owner plaintiffs.166 By contrast, the acts of
possession exhibited by the Liners seem to epitomize the kind of
revolutionary challenge to the agenda-setting authority of the true owner
that some scholars say is essential for real adverse possession or
acquisitive prescription to prevail.167

160. Id. at 773–74. The Court also noted the Liner family’s reliance on the
land as its primary source of income and the important fact that other trappers in
the community recognized the Liners’ boundaries. Id. at 770.
161. Id. at 774.
162. Buckley v. Dumond, 156 So. 784 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
163. Justice Dixon merely stated that “[u]nlike the defendants in Buckley v.
Dumond, which involved neighboring swampland, the Liner family possessed as
owners.” Liner, 319 So. 2d at 769 (citing Buckley, 154 So. 784).
164. In Buckley, the claimant only trapped and grazed cattle. His
improvements consisted of only a small ditch to facilitate trapping activities and
a camp that served as temporary shelter for hunting and trapping. Id. at 788–90.
165. Id. at 788−90.
166. Id.
167. Katz, supra note 71, at 63–79; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra
note 1, ¶ 282, at 149 (acts of the possessor must be “sufficiently serious to
represent a usurpation which should be repressed”).
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After Liner, in a series of stranger cases decided over the last three
decades, Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly held that long-term
possessors in fact possessed with the intent to own, even though record
owners attempted to discredit their possession as being merely precarious.
The courts often reached this conclusion because of the lack of any
meaningful relationship between the possessor and record owner; that is,
because the parties were strangers. In one case, the appellate court reversed
a trial court finding that the possession was precarious in a dispute in
which the parties owned adjoining tracts of land but did not know each
other.168 In that decision, the court described article 3427 as creating a
“strong legal presumption” that a possessor possesses as owner, a
presumption that the hearsay testimony of a deceased possessor’s alleged
declaration against interest almost 20 years before the litigation could not
rebut, especially when the claimant’s possession was “established by the
lengthy use of the property.”169 In another case, the appellate court
affirmed a trial court ruling that the adverse possessors established 30-year
acquisitive prescription against a corporation that had purchased the land
in dispute situated on the bank of a navigational canal from a record owner
who had ignored the claimants’ extensive use of the land as a commercial
campsite.170 There, citing article 3427, the court observed that a
possessor’s intent to possess as owner “may be inferred from all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances”171 and concluded, in the absence of
any relationship between the parties, that the claimants acted as the sole
owner of the land in dispute.172 In yet another case, a claimant church
established acquisitive prescription against a handful of descendants of the
original record owners who had purchased the land for the benefit of the
church.173 The claimant church defeated the allegation of precarious
possession made by the record owners’ descendants by pointing to its 100year history of allowing families to live on the property and otherwise
acting as if it were the owner for purposes of dealing with third parties, the
State of Louisiana, and local government.174 In other words, even if the
adverse possessor and record owner initially enjoyed a close relationship,
when that relationship disintegrates such that the actual parties to the dispute
are strangers, precarious possession does not constitute a meaningful defense.
168. Williams v. McEacharn, 464 So. 2d 20, 2224 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
169. Id. at 24.
170. Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 862 So. 2d 1010 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
171. Id. at 1015.
172. Id. at 1020.
173. St. John Baptist Church of Phoenix v. Thomas, 1 So. 3d 618, 62226 (La.
Ct. App. 2008).
174. Id. at 622.
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In one particularly clear example of this jurisprudence constante,175 the
case of Brunson v. Hemler,176 the adverse possessors established ownership
of 60 acres of rural land by proving that they and their ancestors possessed
the land in dispute since at least 1936 by planting crops, raising cattle,
fencing and enclosing the land, and regularly clearing the woods.177 The
record owners—a private trust and two universities—had much less
significant contact with the land. Indeed, only one of the defendants could
testify about ever visiting the land, a visit that had reportedly occurred 43
years before the litigation.178 Citing two other decisions,179 the record
owners asserted that the claimants were precarious possessors who must
provide “some kind of direct or dual notice” before acquisitive
prescription could begin.180 Rejecting this plea, the court of appeal held
that “the testimony yields no indication that Plaintiffs and their ancestorsin-title occupied and used the disputed property in any capacity other than
as owners”181 and concluded that the presumption of article 3427 that a
possessor intends to possess as owner was “not rebutted.”182 In Brunson,
the court refused to muddy the waters of the plaintiffs’ acquisitive
prescription claim with precarious possession because the parties were, in
short, utter strangers to one another.
Finally, Charles Tolmas, Inc. v. Lee183 presents a striking example of
a successful urban squatter who laid claim to a vacant lot next door to his
business, eventually acquired most of it by 30-year acquisitive prescription
and, along the way, overcame the allegation made by the undisputed
record owner that his possession was tolerated as a neighborly
accommodation.184 In Tolmas, the trial court ruled that the claimant’s
175. Jurisprudence constante refers to the practice of Louisiana courts giving
deference, but not being blindly subservient to, a series of prior judicial decisions
by the same or a higher-level court. Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian
Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L.
REV. 1369, 1372 (1988).
176. Brunson v. Hemler, 989 So. 2d 246 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
177. Id. at 24951.
178. Id. at 251.
179. See Humble v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1968), discussed
infra at notes 31023 and accompanying text; Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299
(La. Ct. App. 1980), discussed infra at notes 191−97 and accompanying text.
180. Brunson, 989 So. 2d at 251.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 903 So. 2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
184. The record owner, Charles Tolmas, Inc., sued in 1998 seeking a judicial
declaration that the defendant, Calvin Lee—and after his death, his estate—had
no ownership interest in a vacant parcel situated on Metairie Road, a well-
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possession of the vacant lot had been open, continuous, unequivocal, and
uninterrupted for 47 years and therefore that the claimant acquired
ownership of most of the lot by acquisitive prescription.185 The court of
appeal affirmed, rejecting the record owner’s arguments that the claimant
had not sufficiently enclosed the property and “that [the Tolmas family]
knew the area was being used for parking by the Lees, but they did not
complain because they were trying to be neighborly.”186 Responding to the
latter contention of precarious possession, the court emphasized the open
and public nature of the claimant’s possession and, just as important, the
record owner’s awareness of and passivity toward the claimant’s use of
the land.187
Although it did not cite article 3427 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the
court in Tolmas clearly ruled as if the burden of proving precariousness
rested with the record owner, and the court was thus unwilling to give
much credence to the record owner’s ex post claim that it had merely been
tolerating the claimant’s use as a neighborly accommodation.188 The
court’s lack of sympathy for the precariousness defense can be explained
by the lack of any real neighborly relationship between the parties.
Although their lots may have been adjacent to one another, the two
families involved in the conflict—the Lees and the Tolmases—were not
neighbors in the traditional sense. On the busy commercial corridor of
Metairie Road in suburban New Orleans, the two families in this case
essentially ignored each other until the record owner instituted its lawsuit in
1998, by which time, the court found, acquisitive prescription had run. In
sum, just like many of the other stranger cases, Tolmas demonstrates that
when parties in a possession or acquisitive prescription suit are actually
nothing more than strangers to one another, an allegation of precarious
possession by the record owner is unlikely to prevail.
2. Stranger–Claimant as Precarious Possessor
Occasionally a court will classify a person who appears to be a classic
stranger–claimant as a precarious possessor. This classification typically
traversed commercial corridor in the suburbs of New Orleans. Id. at 662. Lee
operated a dry-cleaning business on a lot next door to the vacant Tolmas lot that
he owned and on which he had constructed a building in 1951. Id. In 1951, Lee’s
customers and employees began using a triangular shaped area on the Tolmas lot
to park their vehicles. Id.
185. Id. at 664.
186. Id. at 665.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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happens because the court views the case as falling into one of the other
paradigm possession or acquisitive prescription categories. In other
instances, a court will simply give undue weight to an inadvertent
testimonial admission. In Buckley v. Dumond,189 the court of appeal held
that claimants who trapped animals, grazed cattle, and built a few minor
and temporary improvements on undeveloped swampland were really
possessing with the mere tolerance of the record owner, who had leased
the land in dispute to another trapper who actively monitored the land.190
In a sense, the court in Buckley viewed the parties as neighbors and
members of the same close-knit community, rather than as strangers.
In another well-known decision that arguably involves strangers,
Harper v. Willis,191 the claimant in a possessory action, Harper, physically
possessed three lots that were part of a failed subdivision development on
the outskirts of Alexandria, Louisiana for more than 30 years by grazing
cattle on the land.192 Although Harper’s physical occupation of the land
began around 1939, sometime thereafter a caretaker of the property for a
purported owner reportedly gave Harper permission to run cattle on the
land rent-free “if Harper would look after the property, keep the fire out
and brush down.”193 After the caretaker abandoned his duties, Harper
“took over the property in 1947.”194 The only other contact between
Harper and a record owner occurred in 1960 when Harper wrote a letter to
an apparent record owner offering to buy one of the lots in dispute.195
Based on these facts and a review of his deposition testimony, the
court concluded that Harper lacked the requisite intent to possess as owner
sufficient for a possessory action.196 Relying heavily on Buckley, the court
repeatedly emphasized that Harper’s own candid testimony, in which he
admitted, for example, that he never intended to “take” the property or
“beat anybody out of anything,” proved that he lacked the intent to possess
as owner, despite considerable objective evidence that he was acting in the
189. 156 So. 784 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (showing that Buckley brought a similar
suit against Theriot, and the two cases were consolidated).
190. Id. at 78890.
191. Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
192. Id. at 130102. Harper testified that although a fence did not surround the
three lots in dispute, there was a fence around the entire two sections of land that
constituted the larger “Old Pecan Orchard Subdivision.” Id. Harper apparently had
acquired many of the other lots in the subdivision in the period between the
commencement of his physical possession and the time of the litigation. Id. at 1301.
193. Id. at 1301.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1302.
196. Id. at 130207.
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manner of an owner. Perhaps the best way to understand Harper, then, is
to acknowledge that the caretaker’s purported grant of permission to
Harper, vague and uncertain as it was, created a contractual relationship
between Harper and the record owner—that of principal and agent—placing
this case in this Article’s second category of possession and acquisitive
prescription disputes.197
Finally, sometimes a court will simply make a poor judgment in what
otherwise appears to be a classic stranger case. In Levy v. Germania
Plantation,198 the decision that Professor Hargrave worried might read badfaith acquisitive prescription out of the Civil Code, the court characterized
a claimant as a precarious possessor based solely on one naïve crossexamination statement even though the claimant was completely unaware
of the identity of the true owner of the land in dispute.199 In Levy, both the
trial and appellate courts admitted that but for this ill-advised but candid
statement, the claimant would have prevailed under the normal
presumptions of the Civil Code because from an objective viewpoint, his
acts of possession were consistent with those of someone possessing as if
he had record title.200 In another arguably sui generis stranger case, McCoy
v. Toms,201 the court of appeal appears simply to have latched onto
precarious possession like a deus ex machina to solve a difficult quandary,
even though the claimant, from an objective standpoint, appeared to have
no relationship whatsoever with the record owner that would logically lead
to his classification as a precarious possessor.202
197. After all, as the Civil Code teaches, “[a] mandate is a contract by which
a person, the principal, confers authority on another person, the mandatory, to
transact one or more affairs for the principal.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989 (2016)
(emphasis added).
198. 395 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
199. Id. at 371 (noting that on three different occasions the claimant stated that
“while he was possessing the property in the same manner as he would have if he
had had record title, he did not consider himself as owner until he was approached
for an oil, gas and mineral lease some three years ago”).
200. Id.
201. 384 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
202. In McCoy, all the parties believed that the two and one half acre tract in
dispute was owned by the State of Louisiana because it appeared to form part of
the bed of Lake Bisteneau. Id. at 519. The trial court ruled that the claimant–
possessor lacked the intent to possess as owner and, paradoxically, was in “legal
bad faith,” permitting the record owner to elect whether to keep the extensive
improvements that the claimant–possessor had erected on the land and pay him
for the materials and workmanship or require the possessor to remove the
improvements. Id. at 519–20. The court of appeal affirmed both of these
inconsistent rulings, noting only that everyone believed the property in dispute
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Despite these occasionally aberrant decisions, in almost all true
stranger cases, courts will characterize a claimant–possessor as possessing
as owner or at least in the manner of an owner. The success of the
claimant’s possessory action or acquisitive prescription claim thus turns,
as it should, on other factors.
B. Contractual and Legal Status Relationships
The second general category of possession and acquisitive prescription
cases involves a claimant–possessor and a record owner who have some
contractual relationship with one another or share some clearly defined legal
status relationship, for example, as co-owners, family members, or some
other sui generis legal status.203 Regardless of the particular source of the
relationship, however, courts generally characterize the claimant as a
precarious possessor at the outset of the claimed period of corporeal
possession.204 In these cases, the outcome will usually turn on whether the
precarious possessor has provided “actual notice to the person on whose
behalf he is possessing that he intends to possess for himself,” or whether,
in the special case of co-owners, “he demonstrates by overt and
unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner that he intends
to possess the property for himself.”205
Courts routinely favor record owners in many contractual situations,
especially in cases involving lessors and lessees, principals and agents, and
vendors and vendees. However, in cases involving non-contractual
relationships, the rulings are somewhat less predictable. In the context of
co-ownership in particular, courts have developed specialized rules and
presumptions that allow active, in-possession co-owners to terminate
precarious possession and assert acquisitive prescription against passive,
out-of-possession co-owners in some situations. In these cases, courts will
often guard against abuse by co-owners, especially when the passive coowner is a vulnerable family member. In family disputes that do not
involve co-ownership and in other sui generis relationships, precarious
possession is a status that remains difficult to dislodge.
was owned by the state and that the “important fact is that the defendant and his
predecessors never intended to claim ownership or possess as owners.” Id. at 522.
203. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier enumerated the many diverse contractual
and quasi-contractual relationships that can give rise to precarious possession
beyond those specifically mentioned in article 2236 of the French Civil Code. For
their lengthy list and discussion see BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note
1, ¶¶ 303–309, at 161–65.
204. See generally cases discussed infra notes 20621 and accompanying text.
205. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3478 (2016); see also id. art. 3439.
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1. Contractual Relationships
The clearest examples of contractual relationships giving rise to strong
presumptions of precariousness arise when the claimant and record owner
share a nominate contractual relationship, for example, that of lessee and
lessor, agent and principal, real right holder and owner, or vendee and
vendor. In almost all of these cases, the claimant must demonstrate by
clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession has changed character
and become adverse to the record owner, a burden that the claimant usually
cannot meet.
a. Lessees and Lessors
In most contractual settings, claimant–possessors will be hard-pressed
to establish they have been possessing non-precariously, that is, in the
manner an owner would possess and for their own benefit. Article 3438 of
the Louisiana Civil Code, which instructs that precarious possessors are
presumed to continue to possess for another although the possessors may
have privately intended to possess for themselves, specifically lists a lessee
as a precarious possessor.206 Consequently, when a lessee attempts to
assert acquisitive prescription or otherwise protect a possessory interest
vis-à-vis a lessor–record owner, the lessee will usually fail because courts
are quick to characterize the lessee as a precarious possessor. This
tendency was true in the 19th century, 207 and it has remained true over the
last 25 years.208

206. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3438 (2007).
207. Jackson v. Jones, 14 La. Ann. 230 (La. 1859) (stating that purchasers of
a 50-year lease could not change the nature of their tenure for purposes of
acquiring ownership by ten-year acquisitive prescription); Calmes v. Duplantier,
14 La. Ann. 814 (La. 1859) (stating that decedent’s widow could not gain
ownership of slaves through ten-year acquisitive prescription because “her
husband held them by the contract of hire, and not by title as proprietor”).
208. Linder Oil Co. v. LaBoKay Corp., 556 So. 2d 899, 902 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (showing that claimant who asserted that his ancestor-in-title acquired
ownership through farming activities could not establish prescription because
farming took place with permission of the record owner’s predecessor-in-title
through an agricultural lease and thus was precarious); see also Comeaux v.
Davenport, 452 So. 2d 818, 82122 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that invalid lease
did not render possession precarious when lease was signed by only one of two
co-owners as lessors, and the court had serious misgivings that the illiterate
lessee–possessor’s consent was validly given).
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b. Agents and Principals
A similar pattern emerges when a possessor–claimant begins
possession as an agent for a principal who happens to be the record owner
of the immovable property in dispute. In an 1878 decision involving
changed identities, illegitimate children, and an emancipated former slave,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that mere agents “cannot acquire a legal
possession, because it cannot be presumed that they had the intention of
possessing for themselves, and even if they did entertain that dishonest
intention, their possession continues to be that of the person for whom they
originally took it.”209 In Cortinas v. Peters,210 the Louisiana Supreme
Court similarly held that a would-be seller of five lots in New Orleans
could not establish the validity of his title by establishing that his
predecessor-in-title had acquired ownership by 30-year acquisitive
prescription. That claim failed, the Court held, because the predecessor
had possessed the property only as agent for a bank, which itself had
acquired title to the property many years earlier.211 In the exceptional case,
a court may hold that an apparent agent is not a precarious possessor, but
only if the scope of the agency relationship does not include the property
in dispute.212
c. Servitude Holders and Servient Estate Owners, Usufructuaries
and Naked Owners
The person entitled to enforce a predial servitude or a usufructuary
engages in quasi-possession of the servitude or usufruct at issue with either
the express contractual permission or implied permission of the servient
estate holder or the naked owner. Accordingly, courts have found that
these kinds of possessor–claimants cannot acquire ownership of land
subject to the servitude or usufruct by acquisitive prescription without
209. Neel v. Hibard, 30 La. Ann. 808, 809 (La. 1878) (stating that the plaintiff
was unable to claim “legal and peaceable possession” of a lot and improvements
in the City of New Orleans).
210. 68 So. 2d 739 (La. 1953).
211. Id. at 741.
212. Wm. T. Burton Indus., Inc. v. McDonald, 346 So. 2d 1333, 1335–37 (La.
Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a man who worked as a timber cruiser–agent for a
timber company was not a precarious possessor and could acquire land through
30-year acquisitive prescription because he did not know that the company owned
the 40 acres in dispute, did not ask or receive permission to use, and never leased
the land in dispute, and claimant and his father cultivated and completely enclosed
the land in dispute along with other land they owned for many years).
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providing particularly explicit notice of their intent to possess as owner. In
a classic 1910 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the holder
of a servitude of right of way could not acquire ownership of land subject
to the servitude through ten-year acquisitive prescription by relying solely
on registry of a title from a third person.213 Quoting extensively from
French sources, Justice Provosty explained that to notify the actual owner
of the change of status, a servitude holder or usufructuary must “indicate
by some outward acts of possession his intention to hold no longer under
the old title but under the new” and that “these acts must be of an unusually
pronounced character.”214 In short, this kind of precarious possessor must,
in Provosty’s words, “so conduct himself as to let the owner know that a
new order of things has begun.”215 In a 1964 decision, the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal observed that because a usufructuary is a
precarious possessor, the usufructuary generally cannot assert acquisitive
prescription against a naked owner.216 More recent appellate court
decisions have reached similar conclusions, rejecting claims of acquisitive
prescription in cases involving both predial servitudes217 and usufructs.218
d. Vendors and Vendees
When an owner sells immovable property but the vendee, for some
reason, does not immediately take corporeal possession of the property
213. John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan’s La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 53 So.
22, 34 (La. 1910).
214. Id. at 35.
215. Id.
216. Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375, 380–81 (La. Ct. App. 1964)
(citing Leonard Oppenheim, The Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 18 TUL. L.
REV. 181, 217 (1943)). In Succession of Heckert, the court never reached the
question of whether the former usufructuary took any action that would have
constituted notice of an intent to possess as owner. Id. at 381. Indeed, as the
usufruct at issue only lasted for approximately one year because the usufructuary
remarried, and the case was litigated approximately 24 years later, it was
inevitable that the usufructuary’s possession would have been characterized as
precarious. Id. at 37677.
217. Grieshaber Family Props. v. Impatiens, Inc. 63 So. 3d 189, 197 (La. Ct.
App. 2011) (concluding that the holder of a written servitude of view prohibiting
construction on a disputed commercial lot in New Orleans was a precarious
possessor and could not assert acquisitive prescription against the servient-estate
owner absent acts that would have been sufficient to put the latter on notice of an
intent to possess as owner).
218. Hooper v. Hooper, 941 So. 2d 726, 731 (La. Ct. App. 2006), see
discussion infra notes 226−28 and accompanying text.
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sold and the vendor remains in possession, courts routinely characterize
the vendor as a precarious possessor who cannot bring a possessory action
or assert acquisitive prescription unless the vendee has received clear
notice that precarious possession has ended. After the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s classic exposition of this rule in Frost Lumber Industries v.
Harrison,219 Louisiana courts have frequently followed its example220 and
even extended it to other analogous contexts, including partitions.221
2. Co-Ownership Disputes: Context Matters
When two or more persons own a thing in indivision in Louisiana,
each of the co-owners has a right to use the thing according to its
219. 41 So. 2d 674, 675–676 (La. 1949). This case involved a partition action,
and the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the widow of a man who had
purchased an 80-acre tract of land in 1901 could not intervene and assert
acquisition of title by acquisitive prescription because her possession was
precarious in two respects. Id. First, in 1913, the widow sold her undivided onehalf interest in the land to the ancestor-in-title of the lumber company that
eventually brought the partition action. Id. As a vendor who retains physical
possession of the property sold, she was presumed to possess precariously for her
vendee and could not terminate that precariousness until she apprised the vendee
of her change in status. Id. Second, Harrison also possessed a one-half undivided
interest in the tract as usufructurary. Id. As a result, although she was entitled to
remain in possession of the entire tract until she was divested by the partition
initiated by her vendee, the “quality” of her physical possession was converted
from its duality of owner and usufructuary to that of “merely usufructuary.” Id.
220. Maddox v. Vanlangendonck, 334 So. 2d 739, 743 (La. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that a person possessing under a bond for deed contract is a precarious
possessor); James Harvey Ramsey Estate, Inc. v. Pace, 467 So. 2d 1202, 1208
(La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the heirs of a vendor who held possession of a
five acre tract of land could not assert a possessory action against the vendee’s
son and heir because the vendor’s heirs were bound by the warranty obligation in
the original warranty deed and subsequent correction deed and noting that “[h]eirs
of a vendor-warrantor of peaceful possession to a vendee, accepting the
succession, are not in a situation of third-party usurpers or bad faith possessors
adverse to their ancestor’s vendee”).
221. Feazel v. Howard, 511 So. 2d 1306, 1308 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (applying
the principle of Frost Lumber to a dispute among co-heirs who acquired
neighboring tracts of land by virtue of a partition and analogizing possession
exercised by one co-heir over land of another co-heir to that of a vendor retaining
possession for the vendee, ultimately concluding that “retention of possession by
a former co-owner makes him the presumed precarious possessor for the other
former co-owner who by virtue of the partition has become owner in full of a
specified parcel”).
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destination and cannot prevent the other co-owners from making use of it,
unless a use and management agreement otherwise restricts the use of the
thing by the co-owners.222 Because of this fundamental rule of coownership, co-owners in possession are presumed to be possessing for
themselves with respect to their own undivided interest and on behalf of the
other co-owners, and, therefore, their possession is deemed to be precarious
with respect to fellow co-owners.223
Building on this foundational principle, articles 3439 and 3478 of the
Louisiana Civil Code provide specialized rules for termination of precarious
possession by co-owners. In the context of possession alone, article 3439
instructs that “[a] co-owner, or his universal successor, commences to
possess for himself when he demonstrates this intent by overt and
unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner.”224 In the
specific context of acquisitive prescription, article 3478 reiterates that a coowner “may commence to prescribe” by meeting the same notice standard
of “overt and unambiguous acts,” but this article adds by way of illustrative
example that “[t]he acquisition and recordation of a title from a person other
than a co-owner may mark the commencement of prescription.”225
Given the frequency with which co-ownership arises in Louisiana as the
result of inter-family donations, succession, divorce and the termination of
community property regimes, as well as through intentional acquisitions by
two unrelated persons, that a rich body of case law has developed involving
precarious possession and co-ownership is no surprise. Although courts
might be expected to favor precarious possession defenses asserted by outof-possession co-owners overwhelmingly, the case law has in fact yielded
mixed results.

222. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 801–802 (2016).
223. Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1221; Hendrick v. Lee, 471 So. 2d 904,
908 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
224. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439.
225. Id. art. 3478. Hargrave explains that this additional language in article
3478 was intended to codify the rule in Dupuis v. Broadhurst. 213 So. 2d 528,
529–32 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that when one apparent co-owner transfers
his undivided interest to another and that transfer is executed and recorded, this
act gives adequate notice to other alleged co-owners out of possession that the
transferee co-owner intends to possess for himself as owner). Hargrave, however,
was doubtful that the indexing system for property records would allow a coowner out of possession to detect recordation of a title from another person.
Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1222.
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a. Co-Owners Who Remain Precarious Possessors
In many cases, courts do hold, as might be expected, that co-owners
in possession of immovable property possess precariously for their fellow
co-owners and cannot prove they gave sufficient notice of their intent to
possess on their own behalf. Sometimes, as in Hooper v. Hooper,226 a case
in which the appellate court rejected an assertion of 30-year acquisitive
prescription by one brother against the estate of his mentally incompetent
brother regarding a one-sixteenth ownership interest in family property,
the result can be easily explained. In Hooper, not only did the appellate
court note blatant defects in the purported title from another person upon
which the claimant relied to found his claim of voluntary transfer of
ownership,227 it expressed a strong conviction that the claimant could not
possibly have given adequate notice of his intent to possess as owner to
the out-of-possession co-owner because of the latter’s vulnerability.228
In another recent decision,229 the same appellate court, citing Hooper,
rejected an acquisitive prescription claim in a boundary dispute because
one of the claimant’s four siblings failed to execute a partition deed
resulting from his parents’ succession and because neither that sibling’s
estate nor any of his descendants were given adequate notice of the
partition.230 In particular, the court found that the claimant could not tack
his possession to that of his parents to satisfy the prescriptive time period
because of the precarious nature of his possession vis-à-vis one deceased
sibling and the absence of any overt and unambiguous act that could give
notice to his deceased sibling’s estate or descendants.231
More recently, in Cockerham v. Cockerham,232 a court similarly
determined that 30-year acquisitive prescription did not start to run
because an invalid 1963 deed from a third person to the claimant’s father

226. 941 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
227. The court found that the deed, which the brothers’ mother signed and
purportedly transferred the one-sixteenth ownership interest to the claimant while
allowing the incompetent brother to retain a usufruct, failed to transfer ownership. Id.
at 730.
228. In light of his brother’s mental incompetence, the court concluded that the
claimant could only satisfy the “overt and unambiguous acts” requirement by giving
actual notice to his brother’s legal representative, a feat not possible until many
years later when a representative was finally appointed and qualified. Id. at 731.
229. Graham v. Bernheimer, 6 So. 3d 343 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
230. Id. at 344–46.
231. Id. at 347.
232. 16 So. 3d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
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did not constitute notice to the claimant’s co-owners.233 Not only was the
deed authored by a person who did not have any actual or future interest
in the property to convey, but no other acts of possession followed that
could have given the other co-owners notice of the claimant’s intent to
possess the property in dispute as the sole owner.234 Finally, in Andras v.
Thibodeaux,235 another partition case involving multiple co-owners who
inherited property from a common ancestor, the appellate court held that
multiple acts of possession of the intervenor claimants—including
fencing, building houses and other structures, raising animals, cutting and
planting trees—still failed to place the other co-owners on notice of an
intent to possess as exclusive owners, particularly in the absence of any
title or document translative of ownership.236 In all of these cases, courts
treated the general presumption that a precarious possessor continues to
possess for or on behalf of his fellow co-owners in a robust fashion.
b. Co-Owners Who Terminate Precarious Possession
Despite these decisions hostile to acquisitive prescription claims
asserted by co-owners, sometimes a co-owner can establish 30-year
acquisitive prescription vis-à-vis another co-owner. The common
denominator in this alternative line of decisions is the combination of a
recorded instrument, whether executed by a third party or another coowner, that is either translative or declarative of ownership, and substantial
acts of possession that are capable of providing reasonable notice that
possessing co-owners intend to possess for their own interest. In addition,
strong equitable factors, such as the length of time of the claimant’s sole
possession, investment in the property by the claimant, and extreme
neglect on the part of the out-of-possession co-owner all weigh in the
claimant’s favor.
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Succession of Seals237 is the
foundational modern decision establishing this line of authority. In that
case, the succession of Stokes Seals sued to be placed in possession of a
233. Id. at 1269–70.
234. Id. at 1270. In Cockerham, the other co-owners also acted as if the
property belonged to all of them. Id. at 1271.
235. 157 So. 3d 767 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
236. Id. at 768–71. See also Headrick v. Lee, 471 So. 2d 904, 907–09 (La. Ct.
App. 2d 1985) (holding that brother and his heirs who farmed property for 75 years,
paid all the property taxes, and did not share proceeds with other co-owners did not
terminate precarious possession because acts of occupancy and use, “without
more,” are insufficient to constitute notice of adverse possession to co-owners).
237. Succession of Seals, 150 So. 2d 13 (La. 1963).
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60-acre tract of land based on 10- and 30-year acquisitive prescription.238
The defendants, Stokes’s collateral relatives, denied that he owned the
land exclusively and claimed that they, too, had possessed the land because
they inherited undivided interests from Stokes’s uncle, Henry Seals.239
Stokes apparently had some reason to think he owned the land exclusively
because Henry Seals’s widow had purportedly transferred ownership of
the land to Stokes in 1913.240 That transfer was found to be invalid,
however, because the land was actually separate property that Henry had
acquired before his marriage and, thus, Henry’s widow could not convey
it to Stokes.241 Consequently, after Henry’s death, when the land was
placed in Henry’s succession, Stokes became one of several co-heirs who
acquired undivided interests in the land.242
Soon after the apparent but invalid transfer of ownership in 1913,
Stokes began to engage with the land. First, he paid off two mortgages
burdening the property.243 Then, treating the property as his home, he built
houses, fenced the land, and made other improvements.244 He also farmed
the land, sold timber, granted mineral leases, paid property taxes, and sold
portions of the property.245 In contrast, the defendants displayed little, if
any, interest in the disputed land except when they occasionally needed a
place to live and “did some improving for their own comfort.”246 Further,
while Stokes took care of the defendants’ mother, charged some of his coheirs rent, allowed others to live on the land for short times rent-free, and
granted other “favors,” his actions, the Court observed, were “purely
beneficial” as he “manifested no intention of abandoning his adverse
possession.”247 In short, the Court actually viewed the defendants’ acts of
possession as precarious vis-à-vis Stokes, not the other way around.248
Commenting on the defendants’ long-standing indifference to the land
until they learned of its potential mineral exploitation value, the Court
observed,
238. Id. at 14.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 17.
241. Id. at 17, 19.
242. Id. at 14–18.
243. Id. at 17.
244. Id. at 18.
245. Id. at 17.
246. Id. at 18.
247. Id. at 21. See also Towles v. Heirs of Morrison, 428 So. 3d 1029, 1032
(La. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting same passage from Seals).
248. Seals, 150 So. 2d at 21 (noting that “[t]hese heirs never asserted any real
claim to the sixty acres herein involved until they were ruled into court”).
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The genius of our law does not favor the claims of those who have
long slept on their rights and who, after years of inertia, conveying
an assurance of acquiescence in a given state of things, suddenly
wake up at the welcome vision of an unexpected advantage and
invoke the aid of the courts for relief, under the effect of a newly
discovered technical error in some ancient transaction or
settlement.249
In the end, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Seals held that Stokes
acquired ownership of the disputed land by 30-year acquisitive prescription,
affirming the trial court’s findings that his possession “was that of owner
and was hostile to that of defendants for a period of thirty years.”250
Seals proved to be influential because it established the principle that
co-owners or co-heirs could terminate precarious possession and begin to
prescribe in their own right if they could show some written, recorded
instrument that appeared to convey or declare title or ownership, even if that
instrument was invalid, as long as additional acts of possession occurred
after the recording of the instrument.251 Following Seals, a number of
reported decisions applied its basic teaching and held that co-owners
acquired ownership by 30-year acquisitive prescription on the basis of a
variety of recorded instruments and additional acts of possession. The
recorded instruments that have been found to suffice include a simulated
sale,252 acts of partition,253 and even a prohibited donation omnium
249. Id. at 21 (quoting Lafitte, Dufilho & Co. v. Godchaux, 35 La. Ann. 1161,
1163–64 (1883)).
250. Id. at 21–22.
251. Id. at 17−21. Justice McCaleb’s concurring opinion in Seals cemented
this understanding as he emphasized that Stokes Seals’ acquisitive prescription
claim was well founded precisely because he “went into possession of the
property not as a co-heir or co-owner but as a sole owner thereof under a title
translative of the property notwithstanding that the title under which he acquired
was not a good prescriptive title.” Id. at 22.
252. Detraz v. Pere, 183 So. 2d 401, 402–03 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that
a 1926 deed later claimed to have been a simulation combined with acts of
cultivation and enclosure was sufficient to start 30-year acquisitive prescription).
253. Dupuis v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 525, 531–32, 531 n.1 (La. Ct. App.
1968) (on rehearing) (holding that the claimant’s ancestor-in-title began to
prescribe in his own interest by virtue of two instruments, a partition deed and a
cash deed, each purporting to convey a one-half interest in title, along with acts
of farming and fencing); see also Minton v. Whitworth, 393 So. 2d 294, 297 (La.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding that an act of partition executed by all the co-owners
constituted notice to co-owners that subsequent possession was adverse and
hostile to the common interest).
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bonorum.254 A 1983 decision, in which the recorded instruments included
several 19th-century succession sales and a 1904 act of partition, also pointed
out that no requirement exists that the co-owners who opposed the claim of
acquisitive prescription have actually participated in the transactions leading
to the recordation of title.255 The only kind of recorded instruments that do not
reliably serve this purpose are tax sale adjudications and redemptions.256
Finally, in Franks Petroleum Inc. v. Babineaux,257 a well-known decision
from 1984, the court resolved a dispute between two sets of co-owners who
were descendants of two brothers over the right to receive mineral and royalty
interests by determining that one group had acquired “full title” to the
underlying properties by acquisitive prescription.258 The controversy arose
because in the late 1800s or early 1900s, when one brother sold his interest in
the property to the other, the deed was lost or destroyed and not recorded.259
In the late 1930s, the widow and descendants of the vendor executed a series
of quitclaim deeds reciting these facts and transferring whatever interest
they had in the property to the vendee’s descendants.260 The vendee and
his heirs also exercised possession of the land in dispute from as early as
1900 by living on the property, farming it, growing timber and making
timber sales, selling sand and gravel, and surveying and marking
boundaries.261 In contrast, the vendor’s heirs did not exercise any physical
possession.262 The recorded instrument that started the clock running for
254. Givens v. Givens, 273 So. 2d 863, 868 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that
recordation of a prohibited donation omnium bonorum along with 40 years of
substantial open and public possession was sufficient to commence acquisitive
prescription).
255. Towles v. Heirs of Morrison, 428 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(“The recordation of a deed translative of title is the important factor in giving
notice of hostile and adverse possession to the co-owners. . . . These cases made
no requirement that co-owners participate in the transaction.”). In Towles, the
subsequent acts of possession, commenced 40 years after the partition deed,
included granting timber deeds, mineral leases and hunting leases; maintaining
property lines; and posting signs. Id. at 1031–32.
256. See, e.g., Boase v. Edmonson, 471 So. 2d 847, 851 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that redemption of property within redemptive period was for benefit of
all co-owners and thus did not trigger running of acquisitive prescription). See
also Symeon Symeonides, Property, Developments in Business Law, 1984–85, 46
LA. L. REV. 655, 684–85 (1986) (discussing Boase and other tax sale decisions).
257. 446 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
258. Id. at 864.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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acquisitive prescription, according to the court, was a 1937 ex parte
judgment of possession in the succession of the vendee brother and his
wife that listed their heirs as the owners of the property in dispute.263
In ruling for the possessor–claimants, the court of appeal noted that
recently enacted articles 3439 and 3478 of the Civil Code did not change
the law and cited many of the decisions referenced above for the general
proposition that possession by one co-owner is generally considered as
being exercised on behalf of all co-owners, except,
[W]here a co-owner possesses under a recorded instrument
apparently conveying title (even though the purported conveyance
is invalid), the recorded instrument, together with the acts of
possession, constitutes notice to other co-owners and the possession
is then regarded as hostile to the interests of the other co-owners,
rebutting the presumption that possession is for the benefit of all coowners.264
The court also noted that the language in article 3478 referring to the
“acquisition and recordation of a title from a person other than a co-owner”
merely illustrates the kind of act that can suffice to start acquisitive
prescription running and is not exclusive.265 Thus, the ex parte judgment
of possession sending the vendee heirs into possession of the “whole
interest” in the subject property was “an act of notice to the other record
co-owners of the intended adverse possession of [the vendee’s] heirs.”266
Yet it was most likely the totality of the evidence—the many acts of
possession, the quitclaim deeds attesting to the prevailing heirs’ apparently
honest belief that they were possessing the property as owners, and the
judgment of possession—that accounts for the court’s conclusion that the
vendee brother’s heirs deserved title by acquisitive prescription.
Considered together, these co-ownership decisions illustrate how
Louisiana courts already engage in highly relationship-specific evaluations
of parties’ experiences and expectations regarding property subject to
acquisitive prescription claims. Although the fairness of giving any weight
to recorded instruments of which a passive co-owner may be unaware is
debatable,267 clearly the courts look at these instruments and the subsequent
acts of possession in the context of the particular family or personal

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 865.
Id. at 865–66.
Id. at 866.
Id.
Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1222.
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relationships that have formed and carefully evaluate the demands and
expectations those relationships might reasonably have generated.
3. Other Family Matters: Sticky Precarious Possession
Some precarious possession cases involve disputes among relatives
and family members who are not co-owners. In several reported decisions
in this sub-category, courts characterized claimants as precarious
possessors who could not establish possessory rights or acquisitive
prescription because either the possessor’s status as a permissive possessor
was apparent from the outset based on the nature of the family relationship
or the claimants did not clearly communicate an intent to possess as owner.
In Falgoust v. Innes,268 for example, the court held that a man who had
been given permission by his mother-in-law to erect a building and operate
a garage and filling station on her land was a precarious possessor.269 As a
result, when he was eventually evicted from the land upon the dissolution
of the man’s marriage to the landowner’s daughter, the court held that he
was not entitled to any restitution for the improvements as a good-faith
possessor because he was “not a possessor at all.”270 In a sense, the
claimant in Falgoust was characterized as a mere licensee—and thus as a
precarious possessor—based on the familial relationship he temporarily
enjoyed with his mother-in-law.
In Hammond v. Averett,271 a possessory action, the court found that the
claimants of a 20-acre fenced tract of land that had belonged to their uncle
were also mere precarious possessors.272 Even though they had cared for
their uncle for many years, notified the uncle’s children, who were
presumably their cousins, when their uncle’s health failed, gardened and
raised cattle on the tract after the uncle’s death, and even paid the ad
valorem property taxes after losing contact with the uncle’s children, the
court held that the claimants were “mere users” of the land because they
had not done enough to put the record owners on notice of their intent to
become owners.273 Paradoxically, the claimants’ strong sense of familial

268. 163 So. 429 (La. Ct. App. 1935).
269. Id. at 429.
270. Id. at 430. As the court explained, “[t]he best that can be said for the
defendant is that he had been given the right to erect his garage on the plaintiff’s
property and to keep it there for a reasonable period of time.” Id.
271. Hammond v. Averett, 415 So. 2d 226 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
272. Id. at 227.
273. Id. When a real estate agent engaged by the uncle’s heirs visited the
property a few years before the possessory action, the claimants complained of
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responsibility to their uncle did not advance and may have even
undermined their claim of acquisitive prescription.
In the two most difficult cases in this sub-category involving relatives
who lived nearby to one another, the courts focused more on the
neighborliness of the parties rather than their family status in ruling against
the claimants. In the first, Succession of Kemp v. Robertson,274 the court
held that a claimant known as “Aunt Mae” did not acquire ownership of a
300-acre tract of land through acquisitive prescription because
witnesses—business associates, employees, and relatives of the record
owner—testified that the claimant acknowledged the record owner’s
ownership and once asked the record owner for assistance in building a
boat ramp and cutting some trees on the disputed property.275 In reaching
this decision, the court discounted a long history of corporeal possession
and public assertions of a claim to the land stretching as far back as the
1920s when the claimant and her family returned to the place of her 1882
birth and began living and taking care of the property in dispute.276 In
Succession of Kemp, the evidence of an apparent acknowledgment might
have simply overwhelmed the other strong evidence of the claimant’s
intent to possess as owner.
Finally, in Armstrong v. Armstrong,277 another possessory action,
plaintiffs claimed to have possessed 19 acres of bottomland adversely to
record owners who happened to be their co-heirs.278 In essence, the
plaintiffs, one group of heirs of a common ancestor, Stephen Armstrong,
asserted legal possession of the land against another group of heirs,
Douglas Armstrong and his heirs, who had acquired undisputed title to 47
acres of Stephen Armstrong’s original 140-acre tract of land.279 No fences
or other obstacles separated defendants’ bottomland from the balance of

the heirs’ lack of appreciation, but failed to contact them directly or declare by
their actions that they had changed their intent and were possessing as owners. Id.
274. 316 So. 2d 919 (La. Ct. App. 1975), writ denied, 316 So. 2d 906 (La. 1975).
275. Id. at 924−25 (noting testimony that Aunt Mae did not complain when
the record owner, Kemp, conducted timber operations on the disputed land, which
was known as the “Kemp Tract”; Kemp frequently visited the land; and Kemp
allowed his aunt to stay on the land as its caretaker “by sufferance” because he
felt sorry for her).
276. Id. at 923. The court of appeal hedged its conclusion by observing that even
if Aunt Mae’s possession was exclusive, her possession was interrupted by timber
harvesting in 1933, thus precluding 30 years of continuous possession. Id. at 925.
277. 493 So. 2d 253 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
278. Id. at 254−55.
279. Id.
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the estate, which the plaintiffs owned along with Douglas as co-heir.280
Although the plaintiffs had corporeally possessed the 19 acres in dispute,
the court found that the defendants never abandoned or renounced their
interests in the land, and moreover, that the plaintiffs’ acts of detention
never excluded the defendants from their possession.281 In fact, the court
held that the defendants, who continued to pay taxes on property, were
entitled to a presumption that they continued to retain their intent to
possess as owners.282 Ultimately, the court in Armstrong found that the
plaintiffs could not show any acts that would “bring home” to the
defendants the fact that they intended to take the land in dispute for
themselves.283 The strong familial and neighborly relationship between the
parties, who were technically co-owners of land adjacent to the land in
dispute, was thus decisive.284 Just before quoting extensively from
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, the court indeed characterized plaintiffs’
possession as precarious because it took place “with Defendants’
permission or tolerance.”285 In this sense, Armstrong might even be
characterized as a dispute between neighbors rather than family members
and thus could fall into the third category of paradigmatic precarious
possession cases.286
4. Sui Generis Legal Status Relationships
Occasionally, the parties in a title dispute over land have some special
legal status relationship that does not fall into any of the other categories
described above. Sometimes, as in Thomas v. Congregation of St. Saveur
Roman Catholic Church,287 the relationship is between an institution and
natural persons who serve that institution. In Thomas, the father of the
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 257−58.
283. Id. at 258.
284. As the court noted,
The circumstances of co-heirship and ownership of adjoining property,
the fact that the family resided as neighbors on apparently good terms
until this controversy arose, and the use of the bottom land in common,
are all relevant evidence in the case and are required to be considered in
the evaluation of the possessory action of the parties.
Id. at 259.
285. Id.
286. For discussion of that category see infra Part II.C. See also infra notes
299−392 and accompanying text.
287. Thomas v. Congregation of St. Sauveur Roman Cath. Church, 308 So. 2d
337 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
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claimant–possessors had for many years served as sexton of a church, the
record owner of the property in dispute.288 The court held that his
numerous acts of possession were tolerated at the sufferance of the church
in return for his service as sexton and thus he did not possess “as owner.”289
In Memorial Hall Museum, Inc. v. University of New Orleans
Foundation,290 the unusual relationship was between two different nonprofit institutions. In Memorial Hall, a non-profit corporation that
operated a museum housing Confederate artifacts claimed ownership of a
building that had originally been constructed as an “annex” to a building
owned by a non-profit library association.291 The court ruled in favor of
the successor to the non-profit library association, the University of New
Orleans, holding that the lengthy possession and occupation of the “annex”
by the plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest was precarious because in a
1931 speech the president of the library association stated that he was only
putting the plaintiff’s predecessor into “possession” of the annex “for the
‘use’ of [that organization].”292 Numerous other statements and acts
confirmed that the plaintiff’s predecessor recognized the library
association as owner, and the plaintiff’s predecessor failed to notify the
library association when it did assert ownership of the building.293
Finally, precarious possession can even become an issue when the
object of a dispute is a movable whose possession has been exchanged
under a voluntary arrangement between parties exploring a business
transaction. In SongByrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc.,294 Albert
Grossman, a famous New York music impresario had been given
possession of several master tapes made by a well-known New Orleans
musician—Henry Roeland Byrd, also known as “Professor Longhair”—
for demonstration purposes only.295 The United States Court of Appeal for
the Fifth Circuit thus held that Grossman’s estate could not assert
liberative prescription to defend against the revindicatory action brought
by the musician’s successor-in-interest and could not assert acquisitive
prescription unless it could show that Grossman or his estate had
288. Id. at 338.
289. Id. at 339−41. In Thomas, a local parish priest testified that he specifically
gave the claimants’ father and mother permission to continue living in a house on
the church property when asked. Id. at. 341.
290. Mem’l Hall Museum, Inc. v. Univ. of New Orleans Found., 847 So. 2d
625 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
291. Id. at 627.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 627−28.
294. 104 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 1997).
295. Id. at 775.

2017]

PRECARIOUS POSSESSION

673

terminated precarious possession by giving Byrd, his heirs, or his
successor-in-interest actual notice of an intent to keep the tapes as
owner.296 Just like Falgoust v. Inness,297 SongByrd was essentially a case
involving a claimant–possessor whose possession was characterized as
precarious because it began through an implied and informal license.
In these special legal status cases, courts instinctively use a relational
approach to determine whether the claimant was possessing precariously.
Because the parties began dealing with the property at issue in a particular
familial, institutional, or quasi-contractual relationship that involved some
kind of sharing or mutual accommodation, courts analyze both parties’
expectations in the context of that relationship and seem to demand strong
proof that the cooperative or quasi-contractual nature of the relationship
with respect to the property at issue has ended and that the claimant has
communicated a new kind of interest in the property.298 As the final
category of possession and acquisitive prescription cases discussed in Part
II.C shows, courts would be wise to follow this relational approach even
more self-consciously.
C. Neighbors and Members of Close-Knit Communities
Neighbors and members of a close-knit community can be wonderful
friends. They can lend support to each other in times of trouble. They can
provide each other with camaraderie and entertainment. They can work
together as partners in community projects. However, neighbors and
community members can also become embroiled in bitter conflict. In
particular, when one neighbor uses another neighbor’s property and that
use is tolerated or ignored for a long time, the first neighbor may believe
296. Id. at 781. After the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, the federal district
court in Louisiana transferred the matter to the Northern District of New York.
Applying New York law, the New York federal district court dismissed the action,
holding that SongByrd’s claims were barred by New York’s three-year statute of
limitations for a conversion action. Id. In 2000, the Second Circuit affirmed.
SongByrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2000).
297. 163 So. 429 (La. Ct. App. 1935), discussed supra notes 268−70 and
accompanying text.
298. In another sui generis case involving movables, Matter of Succession of
Hutchinson, the court of appeal held that a surviving spouse’s claim to have
acquired ownership of an antique breakfront and several paintings that had been
the separate property of her late husband by ten-year acquisitive prescription
failed because she possessed the movables in the matrimonial home jointly with
her late husband, “such joint possession was precarious,” and she never took any
steps to change the quality of her possession after her husband died. 2014 WL
1778270, at *4–5 (La. Ct. App. May 1, 2014).
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that she has acquired a property right while the other may believe that
nothing has changed. Indeed, that is exactly the kind of dispute that
surfaced in Boudreaux v. Cummings.299 In these inherently difficult cases,
courts will be tempted to draw on murky concepts emerging from older
French sources, such as acts of “pure convenience” and “mere tolerance,”
regardless of their codal pedigree.300 Further, as the conflicting opinions
in Boudreaux amply demonstrate, resolution of these cases may create
even more uncertainty for Louisiana property law.
As a general matter, courts in this kind of case frequently classify a
possessor–claimant as a precarious possessor, despite a long history of
corporeal possession.301 Occasionally, though, neighbor claimants prove
that they always possessed in their own right or at least began to possess
in their own right at some moment in time and thus succeed in acquiring
ownership or predial servitudes in immovable property by acquisitive
prescription.302 Although the number of recent cases that fall into the
neighbor and close-knit community category is not large, several distinct
jurisprudential patterns emerge.
1. Neighbors as Precarious Possessors Through Acknowledgment or
Agreement
In one line of decisions involving acquisitive prescription claims and
possessory actions asserted by one neighbor against another, courts have
classified claimants as precarious possessors based on evidence of some
acknowledgement or agreement that the claimant’s possession was permissive
at the outset.303 In these cases, although the parties may be neighbors with one
299. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015).
300. For discussion of the sources of these concepts see supra notes 82−94 and
accompanying text.
301. See Humble v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Verret v.
Norwood, 311 So. 2d 86 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Delacroix v. Dean, 901 So. 2d 1188
(La. Ct. App. 2005); Delacroix v. Perez, 794 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
These cases are discussed infra notes 310−53 and accompanying text.
302. See Blanda v. Rivers, 210 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Merchant v.
Acadia-Vermillion Irrigation Co., Inc., 311 So. 2d 86 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Dutile
v. Aymond, 338 So. 2d 350 (La Ct. App. 1976), writ denied, 340 So. 2d 998 (La.
1977); Succession of Kemp v. Robertson, 316 So. 2d 919 (La. Ct. App. 1975),
writ denied, 316 So. 2d 906 (La. 1975); Collins v. Quinn, 366 So. 2d 209 (La. Ct.
App. 1978). These cases are discussed infra notes 354−92 and accompanying text.
303. See Briggs v. Pellerin, 428 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that claimant’s possession was at the sufferance of record owner based
on hearsay testimony of a non-party witness, corroborated by other witnesses,
regarding a conversation between the claimant’s ancestor-in-title and the record
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another, the presence of an acknowledgement or agreement between the
parties suggests these cases may be more properly classified as contractual
disputes in which courts commonly use the presumption of article 3438 to
find that claimants are precarious possessors.304 Moreover, the evidence of
acknowledgement in these cases could support a finding that even though
prescription might have begun to run, the claimants’ recognition of the
other party’s ownership rights nevertheless “interrupted” it.305
2. Neighbors as Precarious Possessors Through Inference
More tellingly, in another series of neighbor decisions, courts
classified possessor–claimants as precarious possessors based, not on an
informal acknowledgement or agreement, but rather on a cluster of more
ambiguous facts and judicial intuitions, including community testimony
indicating the likelihood of permissive use;306 a landowner’s practice of
allowing general community access to the land in dispute;307 inferences by
the court about the likely intentions of the parties;308 and doubts that the
claimant’s acts of possession gave sufficient notice of a claim to the record
owner.309 On occasion, courts have even invented alternative presumptions
to reach a desired outcome.310

owner in which both acknowledged they knew a fence was not on the property
line but agreed to let it remain in place); Dutile v. Aymond, 338 So. 2d 350 (La.
Ct. App. 1976), writ denied, 340 So. 2d 998 (La. 1977) (dismissing possessory
action based on clear evidence that claimant’s ancestor-in-title possessed through
acquiescence of record owner and told the record owner’s lessee that he had put
fence partially on the record owner’s land and promised to remove it when
requested); Succession of Kemp v. Robertson, 316 So. 2d 919 (La. Ct. App.
1975), writ denied, 316 So. 2d 906 (La. 1975) (claimant did not acquire ownership
through acquisitive prescription because several witnesses testified that the
claimant acknowledged the record owner’s ownership and once asked the record
owner for assistance in building a boat ramp and cutting some trees on the
disputed property).
304. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
305. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3464 (2007).
306. Humble, 215 So. 2d at 381; Verret, 311 So. 2d 86.
307. Delacroix Corp. v. Dean, 901 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (La. Ct. App. 2005);
Blanda, 210 So. 2d 161.
308. Humble, 215 So. 2d at 382; Delacroix Corp. v. Perez, 794 So. 2d 862 (La.
Ct. App. 2000).
309. Verret, 311 So. 2d 86; Perez, 794 So. 2d 862.
310. Humble, 215 So. 2d at 382.
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In Humble v. Dewey,311 the claimant was a small-town grocery store
owner who had begun raising crops and pasturing animals to feed his
family on a six-acre tract of land across the road from the two-acre tract of
land that he owned and had inhabited since 1932.312 Although the claimant
stated that he never asked anyone for permission to use the disputed land
and claimed not to know initially who owned it, one of the record owners
told the claimant he could have the land in compensation for debts he owed
the claimant at his grocery store.313 The conflict between the claimant and
the record owners did not surface until 1962, when the record owners
authorized a prospective purchaser to inspect the disputed land and the
claimant denied entry.314 Although the claimant and record owners did not
own adjacent properties, only a public road separated their properties.315
More important was that the parties were quite familiar with each other
through family and community relationships.316
In holding that the claimant was, in fact, a precarious possessor and
thus did not acquire ownership through acquisitive prescription, the court
in Humble acknowledged the claimant’s reliance on the general rule that a
possessor is presumed to possess as owner under article 3488 of the 1870
Civil Code.317 Yet the court appears to turn that traditional presumption on
its head by declaring:
[O]rdinarily the intent to possess as owner should not be inferred
unless the actions of the possessor or the surrounding facts and
circumstances are sufficient to reasonably apprise the public, and
the record title owner of the property, of the fact that the possessor
has the positive intent to possess as owner.318
With this curious framework in place, the court of appeal found that
the claimant’s acts of cultivating and raising animals on the land were
insufficient to establish an intent to possess as owner.319 Indeed, the court
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 380.
314. Id. at 381.
315. Id. at 380.
316. Id. at 381. The claimant, Dewey, and the father of one of the record
owners were “good friends,” and the claimant’s daughter was the other record
owner’s “best friend.” Id.
317. Id. at 382.
318. Id.
319. The court described the claimants’ acts of possession in great detail. Id.
at 380. Yet after stating its inverted presumption requiring a claimant to show
facts and circumstances demonstrating his “positive intent to possess as owner,”
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declared its confidence that the claimant had no intention of remaining on
the land indefinitely and had “occupied the land, therefore, merely by the
suffrage of the owner.”320
Perhaps aware that it was breaking new ground, the court in Humble
also justified its holding, much like the majority opinion in Boudreaux, by
noting the general burden of proof placed on a party claiming acquisitive
prescription and emphasizing that the claimant’s “own testimony,
considered with the surrounding facts and circumstances,” rebutted and
overcame the core presumption that a possessor is presumed to possess as
“master and owner.”321 Make no mistake: the court’s reasoning in Humble
is unclear and contradictory, thus justifying Professor Hargrave’s curt
criticism.322 Yet one way to explain the court’s conclusion is that perhaps
the court of appeal sensed that the claimant’s acts of possession did not
challenge the record owners’ claims radically enough, particularly given
that the parties were so familiar with each other and the community itself
seemed to believe that the claimant was possessing with the permission of
the record owners.323
As the rise in oil and gas prices led to increased mineral exploitation
and competition for land in South Louisiana, eight years after Humble, the
court in Verret v. Norwood324 relied primarily on testimony regarding
community custom about neighborly sharing to reject the plaintiffs’ claim
of 30-year acquisitive prescription in an action to remove a cloud on
title.325 The initial problem for the plaintiffs, the possessor–claimants, in
Verret was that their ancestor-in-title, the original record owner of the 160
acres of Atchafalaya Basin marshland in dispute who had received a patent
from the State in 1888, had lost title to the defendants’ ancestors-in-title
id. at 382, the court seemed to revert back to the traditional presumption in favor
of the claimant–possessor by stating “[w]e agree with defendant that the fact that
we went into possession of the subject property created a presumption that he
possessed it as owner. This presumption is subject to rebuttal, however, and we
think the defendant’s own testimony, considered with the surrounding facts and
circumstances, rebuts and overcomes that presumption.” Id. at 382−83.
320. Id.
321. Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 3488 (1870)).
322. Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1217 n.177 (calling the decision in
Humble “equally erroneous”).
323. Humble, 215 So. 2d at 381 (observing testimony of a community witness
who knew both parties well that she and her sister “assumed that their father had
‘let Mr. Dewey use the land,’ and that nothing had occurred which caused them
to question Dewey’s motives until 1962” and noting that the trial court judge
reached the same conclusion about community views).
324. Verret v. Norwood, 311 So. 2d 86 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
325. Id.
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as the result of a 1906 tax sale.326 The primary act of possession that the
plaintiffs relied on to substantiate their claim of acquisitive prescription
was a 1913 timber harvest of the merchantable cypress on the land
authorized by their ancestor-in-title.327 The defendants’ ancestors-in-title
had also demonstrated little interest in the land, having failed to pay property
taxes in 1909, which in turn caused the land to be adjudicated to the state
until the defendants redeemed the land in 1965 after finally paying all the
taxes in arrears.328
Ultimately, the court in Verret rejected the plaintiffs’ acquisitive
prescription claim for two reasons. First, their ancestor’s initial act of
corporeal possession, although significant in 1913, was never repeated or
followed by any other significant acts of possession.329 Second, ample
testimony by both the plaintiffs’ witnesses and other members of the local
community who inhabited, hunted, and trapped in the Atchafalaya Basin,
established that the land there was generally regarded as a kind of commons
where boundaries and ownership rights were generally ignored.330 As the
court noted,
It was established that in the Basin it was not uncommon for
timber to be removed without the owner’s permission. Hunting,
fishing, trapping, and other such acts were not established to have
been made as owner. Instead those acts were consistent with the
community’s understanding that all property in the Basin was
available for use without regard to ownership.331
In other words, because the entire community acted as if “ownership
was irrelevant,”332 and because the plaintiffs’ acts were consistent with this
community norm of access, the court concluded that the plaintiffs and their
ancestor-in-title never truly had the requisite intent to possess as owner
and thus were precarious possessors, even though the record owner had
largely ignored the property for more than 50 years.333

326. Id. at 88–89.
327. Id. at 93.
328. Id. at 89.
329. Id. at 94.
330. For example, one of the Verret’s own witnesses testified, “it was a
friendly community and you didn’t ask permission from anyone to use property
in the Basin . . . when they hunted, they just went to the best place and hunted.”
Id. at 94.
331. Id. at 94–95.
332. Id. at 94.
333. Id. at 94−95.
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In a difficult neighbor case like Verret, in which neither the claimant
nor the record owner has demonstrated much commitment to the land and
the land itself has generally been available for use by anyone in the
community, precarious possession can thus serve as a convenient tool for
courts to solve an otherwise insoluble dilemma. In another unusual
neighbor case, 25 years later, the court similarly held that even in the
absence of an informal agreement between neighbors, when a landowner
allows a broad segment of the local community to use its land for
designated purposes, a claimant who also uses the land for the same
general purposes can likewise be characterized as a precarious
possessor.334
Finally, in Delacroix Corp. v. Perez,335 an unusually interesting neighbor
case, the court ruled that Chalin Perez, the President of Plaquemines Parish,336
and a corporation he owned—Stella Lands, Inc.—could not acquire
ownership of 294 acres of disputed land in that parish because he and his
corporation were precarious possessors. The controversy originated in a
purported misunderstanding by Perez regarding the eastern boundary of a
riparian tract he owned fronting on the east bank of the Mississippi River.337
Perez reportedly believed that his title, which on its face extended to the
“Forty Arpent Line,” extended all the way to the “Forty Arpent Canal.”338 In
other words, he thought the Forty Arpent Line and the Forty Arpent Canal
were coterminous. In fact, they were not coterminous, and Delacroix
Corporation, an entity that had acquired and maintained control of almost
110,000 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, owned the intervening land
in dispute.339 Perez began using the land in dispute for cattle grazing and

334. Delacroix Corp. v. Dean, 901 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that landowner who claimed title to a private canal on his neighbor’s
property by, inter alia, 30-year acquisitive prescription was a precarious possessor
until he applied for a construction permit on a portion of the canal he had filled
in; before then his only acts of possession were the mooring of elevated boats and
other maritime activities granted to the community at large by the canal owner).
335. Delacroix Corp. v. Perez, 794 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
336. Chalin Perez is one of the two sons of Leander Perez. “Judge” Leander
Perez was the notorious political boss of Plaquemines Parish for almost 50 years.
See Glen Jeansonne, Leander Perez: A Southern Demagogue and Reformer, in
VIII THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY
495 (Edward F. Haas ed., 2001) (describing Perez as “something of a social
reformer, a political figure of national stature, one of the most ardent
segregationists in the South, and an oil tycoon worth millions of dollars”).
337. Perez, 794 So. 2d at 864.
338. Id. at 865.
339. Id. at 864−65.
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crawfishing at some point after he acquired his riparian tract in the early
1950s.340
Delacroix did not file suit to stop Perez from using and occupying the
disputed lands until 1993.341 In 1994, Perez and Stella Lands filed their
own possessory action.342 After the actions were consolidated and the trial
court ruled that Perez and Stella Lands acquired ownership of the disputed
land by 30-year acquisitive prescription,343 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with Delacroix’s argument that Perez’s
possession of the disputed land was precarious.344 For the court, a June
1993 letter written by Perez, himself a lawyer, just six months before the
litigation began, provided the most important evidence of the precarious
nature of Perez’s possession.345 In that letter, Perez first acknowledged that
a portion of a crayfish pond he had constructed was located on Delacroix’s
property, but denied that Delacroix owned the remainder of the land on
which the pond was built.346 Second, he offered to enter into a “long term
lease with a minimal rental to satisfy your concern of adverse possession,”
despite professing insufficient information to determine the exact
boundary line between his and the Delacroix property.347 Finally, his letter
stated: “except that subject to the above paragraph, it was not my intention
to adversely possess land owned by the Delacroix Corporation.”348
One might reasonably interpret this letter as an amicable attempt to
settle a difficult boundary dispute. The court, however, treated it as
practically conclusive evidence of a formal acknowledgement that Perez
“did not intend to claim ownership of property to which Delacroix held
the title.”349 Yet the court also bootstrapped its finding of precarious
possession by referring to other evidence and testimony that tended to
show that Delacroix was intimidated by Perez’s power in the parish and

340. Id. at 864.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 866. One member of the five-judge panel of the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal that decided the case voted to affirm and wrote a lengthy
dissent setting forth his analysis. Id. at 871–78 (Byrnes, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 867 (majority opinion).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. In addition, Perez attempted in 1980 to have Delacroix provide some
written affirmation that it owned at least part of the land on which the crayfish pond
had been constructed to head off an IRS investigation into whether Perez, as parish
president, had used parish equipment for construction of the pond. Id. at 870.
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therefore, its acquiescence to Perez’s use of the land in dispute was
understandable.350
Although it acknowledged that Perez did appear to have “unbridled
use of the subject property”351 and thus in many ways acted as the agendasetter for the property, the court found that Perez never truly interfered
with Delacroix’s ability to exercise its rights and fulfill its obligations of
ownership, including granting mineral leases, granting seismic rights of
way, permitting two oil wells to be drilled on the property—though both
wells proved to be dry—and paying the property taxes throughout the
period at issue.352 In the end, the court found that “by failing to overtly
challenge Delacroix’s use of the subject property, Perez in effect lulled
Delacroix into a false sense of security that Perez was operating within the
terms of the oral agreement between the parties.”353 Although this ultimate
conclusion is certainly defensible, unfortunately the decision, as in the
other difficult neighbor cases discussed above, did not provide any kind of
structured framework to analyze future precarious possession disputes.
3. Neighbors Who Possess as Owners
Although most cases involving neighbors or members of the same
close-knit community result in findings that possessor–claimants are
precarious possessors, at least four reported decisions in this category have
culminated with determinations that possessor–claimants were possessing
with the intent to own. In Blanda v. Rivers,354 the plaintiff and defendants
owned adjoining properties on Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans.355 The
plaintiff, Blanda, sued to force the defendants, the Rivers, to remove water,
gas, and sewer pipes and gas flues in the party wall separating their two
properties that extended onto Blanda’s side of the party wall and beyond
into the air space over his property.356 The Rivers claimed that they had
acquired a continuous and apparent servitude as a result of the continuous
350. The court noted that Delacroix’s president testified that she and her
mother had given Perez permission to use the land in dispute because they were
“intimidated by Perez’s position of power in parish government.” Id. at 868. Other
evidence tended to confirm this intentional accommodation. Id.
351. Id. at 869. Perez erected gates on two canals that bisected the dispute land,
built duck blinds and deer stands, and at one point even evicted a person whom
Delacroix had invited onto the property to go hunting. Id.
352. Id. at 869.
353. Id. at 869–70.
354. 210 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 162.
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presence of these installations through ten-year acquisitive prescription
under article 765 of the 1870 Civil Code.357
The Rivers made the installations in 1951, 17 years before the
litigation ensued.358 Blanda’s predecessor-in-title, Landry, apparently
gave the Rivers permission to install the pipes on his side of the party wall
when the Rivers renovated their building to create apartments.359 Landry
and the Rivers did not execute any writing to document their agreement,
nor did they reach any understanding relating to the establishment of a
predial servitude.360 Indeed, as the court noted, “[t]here was no discussion
of their legal rights and, at least as far as Mr. Landry was concerned, there
was no evidence that he had any other intent except to be a good neighbor
and not to interfere with, nor object to, the Rivers’ installation of the
plumbing facilities.”361 At the time of the installation, Landry was unaware
of his ownership interest in the party wall.362 In fact, although he knew the
pipes “protruded over his property and that he gave his permission,”
Landry learned that he owned half of the wall only when he was
negotiating the sale of his property to Blanda in 1965, shortly before
Blanda filed the lawsuit. 363
Affirming the trial court, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
held that the Rivers had, in fact, acquired a servitude by acquisitive
prescription.364 In this context, the court initially rejected Blanda’s
contention that the Rivers were precarious possessors merely because of
Landry’s acquiescence in the installation of the encroaching pipes and his
subsequent assistance in repairing them in rather obscure terms. 365
However, when it addressed the essential element of adverse possession
in acquisitive prescription generally,366 the court observed more sharply
that “the enjoyment of the right in favor of Rivers’ estate was no less
357. Id. at 162–63. The party wall formed part of the Rivers’ building, but did
not abut Blanda’s building. Id. at 163.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Before reaching the precarious possession argument asserted by Blanda,
the court first found that there was no serious dispute that the claimed servitude
was both continuous and apparent and thus subject to either 10-year prescription
under Civil Code article 765 or 30-year prescription under Civil Code article
3504. Id.
365. Id. at 166 (“At no time did Rivers possess or enjoy the right of servitude for
or in the name of Landry, but always for the exclusive benefit of his estate . . . .”).
366. Id.
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adverse merely because Landry did not object.”367 This observation is
crucial because the court can be understood to mean that implied permission
should not be read into a record owner’s acquiescence or passivity without
some more tangible evidence that the possessor began possession with the
intent to possess for or with the permission of the owner.
Indeed, the court in Blanda seemed to believe that the plaintiff’s
predecessor, Landry, bore the burden of stopping prescription from
accruing. “At any time before the expiration of ten years,” it noted, “Landry
could have protested and stopped the running of prescription, just as was
done by the plaintiff Blanda with regard to the rear most flue installed in
1965.”368 In sum, Blanda represents a robust application of the Civil Code
principle that a possessor is presumed to intend to possess as owner in the
context of a neighbor dispute concerning acquisitive prescription of a
predial servitude in contrast to the relatively weak application employed by
the Louisiana Supreme Court majority in Boudreaux v. Cummings.369
In Merchant v. Acadia-Vermillion Irrigation Co. Inc.,370 the plaintiffs
owned a tract of land in Vermillion Parish bordered on two sides by
property owned by the defendants—two corporations, one of which was a
canal company.371 Until 1981, the defendants’ property had been used as
part of a canal system for irrigation of crops, but in that year the canals
were filled in, and plans were made to subdivide the property in
anticipation of residential development.372 The plaintiffs asserted that they
had acquired ownership of the disputed land formerly covered by the
canals by 30-year acquisitive prescription based on the fact their
predecessors-in-title and their own tenants had farmed and grazed cattle
on the land in dispute up to the edge of the former canal levees for more
than 60 years.373 The only factual conflict concerned whether fences
enclosed the disputed land and what the community understood about the
nature of the plaintiffs’ possession.374
Relying heavily on Verret v. Norwood,375 the defendants argued on
appeal that the plaintiffs’ possession was precarious because it was

367. Id. at 166–67.
368. Id. at 167.
369. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 563–64 (La. 2015).
370. 476 So. 2d 1014 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1015.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1015–16.
375. 311 So. 2d 86 (La. Ct. App. 1975), writ denied, 313 So. 2d 842 (La. 1975)
(characterizing claimant’s possession as precarious because of the community
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“common knowledge in the community” that the canal company
defendant and its predecessor allowed the owners of contiguous tracts to
use their land.376 This argument failed to persuade the court of appeal,
however, because in Merchant the only witnesses who attested to this alleged
policy of sufferance were the company’s own employees,377 and moreover,
the company did not prove that the plaintiffs were even aware of the policy.378
Indeed, buttressing this last point, the court in Merchant distinguished several
decisions in which courts classified neighbor claimants as precarious
possessors based on evidence of an acknowledgement or agreement that the
claimant’s possession was permissive at the outset.379 By contrast, in
Merchant, the record owner failed not only to show that the possessor–
claimants ever realized they were possessing with the sufferance of the record
owner, but it also did not prove that the claimants had requested the record
owner’s permission to use the disputed land or that the canal company had
specifically granted them such permission.380 As the court summarized in
Merchant, “an owner’s mere knowledge that someone is possessing adverse
to his ownership does not prevent the running of acquisitive prescription.”381
In contrast to Boudreaux, the court in Merchant squarely placed the burden
of proof on the record owner to rebut the presumption under Article 3427
of the Civil Code that a possessor was possessing as owner. In other words,
record owners cannot rest on their belief that they are tolerating an
adjoining property owner’s use of their property as a matter of neighborly
convenience and then, only after acquisitive prescription has been alleged,
assert that the neighbor’s possession was merely precarious.
Two more decisions in the neighbor context also show that neither
uncertainty about the location of a boundary nor even actual knowledge
that a fence extends beyond an actual boundary can necessarily render a
perception that land in the Atchafalaya Basin was generally available for use by
all), discussed supra at notes 324−33 and accompanying text.
376. Id.
377. Merchant, 476 So. 2d at 1016.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1016−17 (distinguishing Briggs v. Pellerin, 428 So. 2d 1087 (La.
Ct. App. 1983); Dutile v. Aymond, 338 So. 2d 350 (La. Ct. App. 1976), writ
denied, 340 So. 2d 998 (La. 1977); Succession of Kemp v. Robertson, 316 So. 2d
919 (La. Ct. App. 1975), writ denied, 316 So. 2d 906 (La. 1975); Collins v. Quinn,
366 So. 2d 209 (La. Ct. App. 1978)). As the court noted in Merchant, in all of
these decisions, “the possessor knew that he was possessing with the sufferance
of the owner, and there was, in effect, an agreement, between the owner and the
possessor recognizing that the possessor’s possession was only with the
sufferance of the owner.” Merchant, 476 So. 2d at 1016–17.
380. Id. at 1017.
381. Id.
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claimant’s possession precarious. In Nugent v. Franks,382 the court held
that claimants acquired ownership of 17 acres of rural land by tacking their
possession to that of a predecessor in interest.383 Although the defendants
argued that this predecessor possessed precariously because his cousin and
neighbor allowed him to use a portion of her land as an accommodation,
the court of appeal rejected this characterization. It did so by relying on
the presumption that a possessor intends to possess as owner and by
pointing to evidence that the predecessor “exercised acts of corporeal
possession of the property [in dispute] consistent with ownership of the
type of property involved,”384 that is, in the same manner as the cousin and
neighbor used her own land.
Finally, in Livingston v. Unopened Succession of Dixon,385 the court held
that a claimant had acquired ownership of a strip of land located along the
border of his neighbor’s property through 30-year acquisitive prescription and
rejected the record owner’s precarious possession counterargument.386
Although the facts were generally unremarkable, the court found that the mere
fact that the possessor–claimant was aware that his fence encroached on his
neighbor’s property—and even acknowledged that the fenced boundary line
was incorrect—did not mean that he intended to possess for anyone but
himself as owner.387 In addition, the court stressed that numerous members of
the community at large who were familiar with the property testified that the
fence was recognized as the claimant’s boundary.388
The decisions that fall into this crucial, third category of possession
and acquisitive prescription disputes appear to be contradictory. In some
instances, courts focus on the intrusiveness and extent of the claimant’s
acts of possession.389 In other instances, courts focus on the degree to
which the claimants had made investments in their own property
depending on the neighbor’s acquiescence and the record owner’s
awareness of this reliance.390 In still other cases, courts appear to be
382. 471 So. 2d 816, 823–25 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
383. Id.
384. Id. at 824. In Nugent, the defendants failed to prove a clear chain of title
to the land in dispute that was good against the world in their own petitory action.
Id. at 820–23. In this sense, the property in dispute was literally up for grabs.
385. 589 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
386. Id. at 599–600.
387. Id. at 603.
388. Id. at 604.
389. See Humble v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (relatively
modest physical intrusion); Verret v. Norwood, 311 So. 2d 86 (La. Ct. App. 1975)
(same); Delacroix Corp. v. Perez, 794 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (same).
390. Blanda v. Rivers, 210 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
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influenced by the degree of community recognition of the claimant’s acts
of possession as an indication of either toleration or a shift of ownership.391
Finally, in several cases, courts dwell on the extent to which record owners
communicated their policy of neighborly accommodation to the claimant
and whether the claimant recognized that accommodation.392 What
Louisiana law clearly needs now is a normatively attractive presumption
that aligns with courts’ predilection to encourage neighborly cooperation
and a more coherent analytical framework to establish the limits of that
presumption and to help resolve the difficult claims that arise in disputes
involving neighbors and members of the same close-knit community.
III. THE FUTURE OF PRECARIOUS POSSESSION
Many Louisiana lawyers and jurists must now be wondering what to
make of the three judicial opinions that emerged from the Louisiana
Supreme Court decision in Boudreaux, particularly in light of the majority
opinion’s statement that “[o]ur holding today is strictly limited to the facts
before us.”393 On the one hand, courts might follow the majority opinion
and begin to ignore what up until now had been, at least according to
Justice Knoll (and also Professor Hargrave), the Civil Code’s relatively
well-understood burden-shifting structure regarding possession.394 In that
event, courts may well accept assertions of tacit permission summarily,
without demanding much proof of such permission and without taking into
account the specific relational context of an acquisitive prescription claim
or possessory action.395 The defense of precarious possession could then
391. Compare Verret, 311 So. 2d 86 (community recognition of land in dispute
as commons), with Merchant v. Acadia-Vermillion Irrigation Co., Inc., 476 So.
2d 1014 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (community recognition of claimant’s use of land
bounded by canals).
392. Compare Merchant, 476 So. 2d 1014 (no communication of policy of
sufferance), with Briggs v. Pellerin, 428 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (La. Ct. App. 1983);
Dutile v. Aymond, 338 So. 2d 350 (La. Ct. App. 1976), writ denied, 340 So. 2d
998 (La. 1977); Succession of Kemp v. Robertson, 316 So. 2d 919 (La. Ct. App.
1975), writ denied, 316 So. 2d 906 (La. 1975), discussed supra note 303 and
accompanying text.
393. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 564 (La. 2015).
394. Id. at 565–66 (Knoll, J. dissenting). Justice Knoll’s understanding is
synonymous with Professor Hargrave’s statement of the “core rule” regarding
presumptions and burdens of proof in questions of precarious possession. Presumptions,
supra note 100, at 237, discussed supra note 102 and accompanying text.
395. For example, in Scrantz v. Smith, the court of appeal relied on Boudreaux
to classify a claimant seeking to acquire a predial servitude by acquisitive
prescription as a precarious possessor based on the owners’ “simple tolerance” of
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end up swallowing the general principle that possessors are presumed to
possess as owners, especially in the context of acquisition of servitudes by
neighbors.396 If courts follow this path, Justice Knoll may well be right that
Boudreaux “severely jeopardizes the law on acquisitive prescription in this
state.”397
On the other hand, this unfortunate outcome could be avoided if
lawyers, judges, and jurists treat Boudreaux as a cause for reflection and
as an occasion to begin a new conversation about acquisitive prescription
and precarious possession in Louisiana. As this Article explains, even
though Justice Knoll and Justice Weimer each reached a different
conclusion about the ultimate issue in Boudreaux, both of their opinions
model a relational approach to the kind of complex factual dispute that can
arise in a paradigmatic neighbor or close-knit community case. But before
turning to a detailed reconsideration of Boudreaux, this Article offers new
jurisprudential tools that could help Louisiana courts make sense of the
most difficult precarious possession cases they are likely to confront.
A. New Jurisprudential Tools to Analyze Neighbor and Close-Knit
Community Cases
Louisiana courts have generally applied the traditional presumptions
of possession and precarious possession in cases that fall into the stranger
and contractual or legal status categories in a consistent and principled
manner. As Part II.A demonstrates, when confronted with a stranger case,
courts are hesitant to find that an adverse-possession claimant is a
precarious possessor as long as it is clear the possessor and record owner
have had little or no relationship with each other over the years. In these
situations, the baseline presumption provided by article 3427 of the Civil
Code—that a possessor is presumed to possess as owner—is usually
applied vigorously unless clear evidence demonstrates that the claimant’s
possession began with the permission of or on behalf of another person.
Conversely, as Part II.B shows, courts confronted with cases that
clearly fall into the second paradigm—cases in which the parties have a
contractual or legal status relationship with each other—are appropriately
attentive to the likelihood that the possessor began to possess precariously.
claimant’s use of a right of way for running cattle and thus placed the burden of
proof on the claimant to prove notice of his intent to possess as owner. 177 So. 3d
130, 134 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
396. See Cox, supra note 5, at 983 (noting that the broad use of a presumption
of tacit permission by the majority opinion in Boudreaux “leaves little room in the
law for any acquisitive prescription of a right of passage”).
397. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 568.
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In these cases, the presumption of article 3438—that precarious possessors
are presumed to continue possess on behalf of another even though they
may intend to possess for themselves—serves as the foundational
presumption. As our jurisprudence teaches, however, application of article
3438 does not mean that a record owner will always prevail in such a case.
Sometimes, particularly in the context of acquisitive prescription claims
involving co-owners, a claimant will be able to “[demonstrate] by overt
and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner that he
intends to possess the property for himself” so that acquisitive prescription
can begin to run.398 In general, though, Louisiana courts do not need new
rules to handle cases falling into either of the first two categories discussed
in Part II. Rather, they simply must continue to demonstrate sensitivity to
the distinct relational contexts that these kinds of cases present.
In true neighbor or close-knit community cases, however, the
jurisprudential authority is less clear, and as the cases discussed in Part
II.C demonstrate, courts are much more likely to struggle. Further, when
the nature of the right claimed is a predial servitude, courts will often have
difficulty distinguishing quasi-possession that has been adverse from
simple toleration granted by a record owner, especially when the record
owner asserts that he has tacitly permitted the claimant to use his property
in the spirit of being a good neighbor. Yet, as in Boudreaux, when a
possessor–claimant has used his neighbor’s property for a long period of
time and appears to have organized his relationship to his own land or to
his community in reliance on continued access to or use of the record
owner’s land, strong equitable justifications weigh in favor of recognizing
his claim as well.
1. The Presumption of Sharing
Given the difficulty of cases falling into the third category of possession
and acquisitive prescription disputes, Louisiana should consider developing
an additional presumption—a presumption of sharing that would apply
specifically at the outset of a relationship between a possessor and record
owner who are practicing, inhabiting, engaged neighbors or members of the
same close-knit community. Stated simply, this presumption would provide
that when one neighbor uses a fellow neighbor’s property or when a member
of a close-knit community uses another community member’s property, that
use takes place with the implied permission of the owner. This presumption
could be adopted as a jurisprudential rule by Louisiana courts, or it could be
expressed in a new Civil Code article. In either format, it would provide a
398. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3479 (2016).
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useful complement to the two existing presumptions found in articles 3427
and 3438 of the Civil Code by aligning judicial decision-making with the
fundamental values that inform property law and by enhancing the
predictability of judicial decision-making in this area.
One justification for a new presumption of sharing can be found in the
scholarship of Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver, who have
written powerful pieces about how property law can be understood as an
institution that serves the goal of promoting human flourishing.399 For
Alexander and Peñalver, property law is not solely a utilitarian machine
designed to produce economic efficiency and wealth maximization,
although these are among the many desirable, incommensurable values
that property law can and should promote.400 Drawing on Aristotle,
Aquinas, and other philosophers working in the Aristotelian tradition,
Alexander and Peñalver argue that because humans are essentially social
beings who thrive only through and because of their relationships with
other people and through human community, property law must also be
understood as serving social values.401 Property law should thus facilitate
the development of human capabilities that are necessary for individuals
to be able to choose and pursue their own projects from a meaningful set
of options while also helping to sustain families, friendships, and
communities—the very social networks that make human flourishing
possible.402
One particular aspect of Alexander and Peñalver’s “human flourishing”
theory of property law that is directly relevant to precarious possession is
their insight that an individual must have some property to develop and
practice one of the essential Aristotelian ethical virtues—what might be
called “the virtue of sharing.”403 Describing why Aristotle believed that
399. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) [hereinafter The SocialObligation Norm]; Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821
(2009) [hereinafter Land Virtues]; Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance 91
VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005) [hereinafter Property as Entrance]; GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
THEORY 80–101 (2012) [hereinafter PROPERTY THEORY]; Gregory S. Alexander
& Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Properties of Community].
400. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 399, at 750−51. See generally
Land Virtues, supra note 399.
401. Properties of Community, supra note 399, at 134−45; PROPERTY
THEORY, supra note 399, at 83−97.
402. PROPERTY THEORY, supra note 399, at 90–92.
403. Id. at 80–82. For a discussion of other “land virtues,” including the virtues
of “industry,” “justice,” and “humility,” see Land Virtues, supra note 399, at
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private ownership must form a crucial part of any property system,
Alexander and Peñalver observe,
Another reason [Aristotle] gives in favor of private property is that it
promotes friendship. Aristotle’s thinking here seems to be that
through proper education individuals will learn that property, though
privately owned, is to be shared with friends. Relatedly, private
ownership facilitates the exercise of such virtues as generosity and
moderation. His point here ties in with the one just raised. Aristotle
means to say that the possibility of generosity depends upon the
existence of some degree of private rights. Generosity presupposes a
voluntary act of sharing, so that the owner must willingly transfer to
someone else the power to use and enjoy the resource. And her own
act can only be voluntary and therefore praiseworthy, if she was
entitled not to share.404
This insight explains why article 2232 of the French Civil Code
declared that acts of “mere toleration” cannot lead to prescription and why
Louisiana courts have been hesitant in neighbor cases like Boudreaux to
allow a possessor–claimant to acquire ownership or real rights whenever
owners make plausible arguments that they merely consented to the
claimant’s use or possession in a spirit of neighborly cooperation.
Louisiana courts intuitively recognize the importance of encouraging
neighbors and members of the same community to share their property
with each other to build the bonds of friendship and reciprocity that make
community possible.
Adopting a presumption of sharing will thus encourage courts to
reveal more fully the likely bases of their decision-making in these
difficult neighbor cases. In neighbor cases, judges would no longer feel
the need to manipulate the existing presumptions in the Civil Code to find
a way of stating an important normative value that they likely bring to bear
in most neighbor cases already. In short, adoption of a presumption of
sharing would promote another important systemic virtue—the virtue of
judicial transparency.
A final reason to adopt a presumption of sharing is that the
presumption would enable courts to visualize neighbor and close-knit
community cases not only from the point of view of the possessor, which
is the focus of Louisiana’s two existing presumptions, but also from the
point of view of the record owner. In other words, this new presumption
876−86. Peñalver also asserts that property owners sometimes have an obligation
to share their “surplus” property with others. Id. at 880.
404. PROPERTY THEORY, supra note 399, at 83–84.
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would help judges and lawyers become more fully conscious of what this
Article contends. They already do so subconsciously in these cases—
approaching these disputes in their full relational complexity. Unlike the
existing codal presumptions that are focused solely on the state of mind of
the claimant–possessor, the presumption of sharing directs courts and
lawyers to consider equally the state of mind of the other party, the
neighbor who contends that she was merely practicing the Aristotelian
virtues of friendship and sharing. By openly directing courts’ attention to
the true owner’s perspective, the new presumption would thus bring to the
surface the kind of analysis that courts appear inclined to engage in
regardless, as the Boudreaux case itself demonstrates so clearly.
2. Indicia of Giving or Renunciation
Any useful presumption in law should be capable of being rebutted.
This capability is certainly true for the presumption of sharing. Louisiana
must recognize, therefore, that at any point during the existence of a longterm relationship between two neighbors or members of the same closeknit community, the presumption of sharing could be overcome by clear
signs that the parties have reached a new equilibrium, a new explicit or
implicit understanding about the property at issue. To determine whether
the presumption of sharing has been overcome, courts should be directed
to employ several specific factual criteria. These criteria, which should be
called “indicia of giving or renunciation,” could be spelled out in a new
Civil Code article or articulated jurisprudentially. Either way, they would
serve to channel judicial discretion in difficult neighbor and closecommunity cases in a useful manner.405
The underlying assumption in this scenario is that property
relationships are not static. The reasonable expectations and assumptions
of parties in a long-term property relationship can and do evolve. At some
point, the presumption that a neighbor is sharing her property with another
neighbor to whom she has granted some kind of access evaporates,
especially when it becomes obvious that the passive neighbor has actually
405. The Louisiana Civil Code already contains several articles that provide a
list of factual criteria to channel judicial discretion in cases that inherently require
the exercise of such discretion. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 134 (2016) (listing
factors for courts to consider in determining the best interest of the child in childcustody disputes); id. arts. 3515, 3537, 3542 (listing policies and case-specific
factors to be considered in various conflict of laws disputes). See generally John A.
Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules, Standards and Hybrid
Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REV. 923 (2012) (discussing control
and channeling of judicial discretion throughout Louisiana private law).
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given away, renounced, or abandoned all or a portion of her property or
her right to exclude others from that property.
In some ways, this reasoning may sound like a restatement of the
“negligent owner” rationale for adverse possession and acquisitive
prescription noted earlier.406 This Article’s intention, however, is not to
encourage courts to make simplistic or conclusory statements about a
record owner’s passivity. Instead, courts should focus on the way in which
the neighbor relationship between the possessor–claimant and the record
owner is transformed. After all, as Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier
remarked, acquisitive prescription is a legal institution that has startling
transformative power.407 Courts should therefore be asking if and how
property relationships potentially affected by acquisitive prescription have
themselves been transformed.
With these factors in mind, this Article offers the following indicia of
giving or renunciation: (1) the physical extent and intrusiveness of the
claimant’s use or corporeal possession of the record owner’s property;408
(2) any investments or improvements made by the claimant to the record
owner’s property in reliance on an implicit promise of continuing access
to or use of the record owner’s property;409 (3) any changes made by the
claimant to other property the claimant owns or to the claimant’s other life
projects, economic or otherwise, made in reliance on continued access to
or use of the record owner’s property;410 (4) the degree to which the record
owner’s own actions have signaled an intention to maintain agenda-setting
authority for the property or, conversely, whether those actions or nonactions have signaled a de facto abandonment or renunciation of the
property;411 (5) community perceptions regarding the rights of the parties
406. See discussion supra notes 51−54, 131−34 and accompanying text.
407. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 275, at 145.
408. See Delacroix Corp. v. Perez, 794 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 2000)
(containing a relatively modest physical intrusion); Verret v. Norwood, 311 So.
2d 86 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (finding a relatively modest physical intrusion), cert.
denied, 311 So. 2d 842 (finding the lower court’s decision correct); Humble v.
Dewey, 215 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (finding a relatively modest physical
intrusion).
409. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 567 (Knoll, J. dissenting)
(discussing Boudreaux’s work on gates and maintenance of right of way).
410. See, e.g., Blanda v. Rivers, 210 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1968);
Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 567 (La. 2015) (Knoll, J., dissenting).
411. Compare Perez, 794 So. 2d 862, 869 (discussing continuing acts of
possession exhibited by record owner to justify finding of precariousness), with
Blanda, 210 So. 2d at 166−67 (noting record owner’s acquiescence to
claimant’s encroachments in common wall in support of finding of acquisitive
prescription).
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with respect to the property involved;412 (6) the length of time beyond the 30year prescriptive period the claimant has used or possessed the record owner’s
property;413 and (7) the existence or absence of any acknowledgements by the
possessor–claimant of the record owner’s authority.414
A potential objection is that these criteria are too subjective and vest too
much discretion in judges in neighbor and close-knit community cases
involving precarious possession. Yet the work that Louisiana courts must do
to resolve precarious possession defenses in these cases is already subjective,
as the three divergent opinions in Boudreaux415 and the inconsistent results
in other neighbor disputes reveal.416 Reasonable judges will always bring
their own moral and normative perspectives to bear on these kinds of
cases. If courts were to acknowledge the presumption of sharing explicitly
and then focus their analysis on whether that presumption has been
rebutted with regard to the indicia of giving or renunciation, the results of
neighbor or close-knit community cases would actually become more
consistent and predictable. At a minimum, courts would be more likely to
give full attention to the specific relational facts that these criteria
implicate when they address precarious possession in the neighbor and
close-knit community context.417

412. Compare Verret, 311 So. 2d at 94 (characterizing claimant’s possession
as precarious because of the community perception that land in the Atchafalaya
Basin was generally available for use by all), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 842 (La.
1975) (finding the lower court’s decision correct), with Livingston v. Unopened
Succession of Dixon, 589 So. 2d 598, 603 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing no
community verification of policy of sufferance and community recognition of
claimants’ fence as boundary).
413. See, e.g., Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 567 (noting 60 years of uninterrupted use).
414. Compare Merchant v. Acadia-Vermillion Irrigation Co., Inc., 476 So. 2d
1014, 1017 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing no communication of policy of
sufferance), with Perez, 794 So. 2d at 868–70 (discussing claimant’s acknowledgment
of owner’s title), and Briggs v. Pellerin, 428 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (La. Ct. App. 1983);
Dutile v. Aymond, 338 So. 2d 350 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 998
(La. 1977); Succession of Kemp v. Robertson, 316 So. 2d 919 (La. Ct. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 906 (La. 1975).
415. Boudreaux, 167 So. 2d 559. For more discussion of the majority, dissenting
and concurring opinions see infra notes 418−38 and accompanying text.
416. See discussion in Part II.C, supra notes 299−392 and accompanying text.
417. The rebuttable presumption of sharing and the indicia of giving and
renunciation may prove useful in some special relationship cases as well,
particularly those involving co-ownership and other family relationships.
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B. Reconsidering Boudreaux
With the preceding new analytical framework in place, this Article
now reconsiders the dilemma presented by the difficult factual dispute in
Boudreaux. First, this Section analyzes the three contrasting opinions that
emerged in Boudreaux. It then demonstrates how the new jurisprudential
tools offered—the presumption of sharing and the indicia of giving or
renunciation—could be used to resolve the same factual dispute.
1. The Boudreaux Opinions
The majority opinion authored by Justice Clark is not especially
instructive and, as others have noted, is rather problematic.418 The majority
opinion holds that the plaintiff, John Boudreaux, was merely a precarious
possessor of the right of way that crossed the property of defendant Paul
Cummings by resurrecting the concept of tacit or implied permission from
article 3490 of the 1870 Civil Code.419 In its crucial passage, the majority
opinion states that “Cummings’[s] awareness of Boudreaux’s use and his
allowance thereof marks Boudreaux’s use as an authorized use that cannot
be characterized as adverse under the circumstances.”420 In effect, the
majority opinion suggests that if record owners assert their awareness and
permission of the claimant’s use of their land, even if record owners never
communicate their toleration or permission to the claimant, the claimant
then bears the burden of proving that he is not a precarious possessor.421
Just as problematic is that the majority opinion never explains how to
determine when the owner has actually tolerated the user’s activities or,
conversely, has simply been negligent, uninterested, or failed to set or
maintain an agenda for the property.
The only gesture in this direction given by the majority opinion is to
underline a few words from Professor Yiannopoulos’s treatise: acts of
toleration must not be considered as acts of adverse possession otherwise
“landowners would be compelled to object to innocent and occasional

418. See generally Cox, supra note 5.
419. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562–66.
420. Id. at 564.
421. The majority opinion bases this surprisingly broad view of implied or tacit
permission on a few brief passages of commentary explaining the sources of article
3490 of the 1870 Code and reminding us that the 1982 revision did not change the
law of possession and acquisitive prescription. Id. at 562–63 (first quoting A.N.
YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 139, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
(3d ed. 1997), and then quoting Symeonides, supra note 96, at 81).
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invasions.”422 This Article respectfully suggests that the long-standing acts
of use that took place in Boudreaux—60 years of uninterrupted use of a
neighbor’s land to regularly access a public road and to transport heavy
farm equipment, significant efforts to maintain the right of way, and finally
significant efforts to erect, move, and maintain a gate—represent more
than “an innocent and occasional invasion.”423 Although these actions
might indeed reflect an agreement between the parties, to characterize
them as merely an innocent and occasional invasion seems to miss the
mark.
Justice Knoll’s dissenting opinion is more helpful. First, it reminds
Louisiana jurists of what, up until Boudreaux at least, had been the
conventional understanding of how the general burden of proof regarding
acquisitive prescription and the two presumptions of possession found in
articles 3427 and 3438 worked together to order questions of proof.424
Second, in addition to noting the relative paucity of facts supporting
Cummings’s assertion of precariousness, Justice Knoll explores with
considerable care several facts that reveal how important Boudreaux’s use
of the right of way across the Weill–Cummings property was to him and
the projects of his family over the years. For instance, in addition to noting
that Boudreaux mowed and generally maintained the portion of the Weill–
Cummings tract allegedly subject to the servitude, she observes that
422. Id. at 563 (quoting A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 139, in
4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 1997)).
423. Id. at 560–61 (describing acts of possession); id. at 567–68 (same) (Knoll,
J., dissenting).
424. Id. at 565–67. To summarize succinctly, a person like Boudreaux who
claims to have acquired rights by acquisitive prescription caries a general burden
to prove all the elements of his claim, including the requisite years of possession.
Article 3427, however, helps the possessor meet this burden through the
presumption that a possessor is presumed to possess with the intent to own unless
“it is shown” by the person opposing the claim of possession, here Cummings,
that the claimant’s possession was “begun for another” or was begun “with the
permission of or behalf of the owner.” Id. at 565–66. Only when the opponent—
usually the record owner, but perhaps another person—affirmatively makes this
showing does the presumption of continuing precarious possession under article
3438 arise. This second-order presumption, in turn, requires presumptive
precarious possessors to show that their precarious possession has terminated
under either article 3439 or 3478. In positive terms, all of these requirements mean
“the presumption of ownership does arise, absent a showing that the possession
was begun for another.” Id. at 566. For a brief but authoritative endorsement of
Justice Knoll’s position see YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 5, § 6.36. See also
Presumptions, supra note 100, at 237 (stating same sequence of presumptions
even more succinctly).
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witnesses testified Boudreaux used the passage continuously for various
purposes, including hauling farm equipment, making visits to the doctor,
going to vote, and running errands.425
Further, Knoll reports that Boudreaux employed another individual to
mow the right of way for him in exchange for permission to keep mowing
equipment on Boudreaux’s property and how Boudreaux told this same
individual that the strip of land has “been a right of way for a hundred
years, that they’ve been using [it] since, you know, since their family
owned the property.”426 Knoll also observes the intensity of Boudreaux’s
public commitment to the continuing viability of the claimed servitude, as
evidenced by his participation in public meetings at which a road
construction project was being discussed that could have negatively
affected his use of the right of way.427
In essence, Justice Knoll’s opinion reveals the extent to which
Boudreaux’s reliance on the right of way, though prosaic to some, was
actually central to his ability to flourish as a member of his local
community. Not only did he use the right of way to facilitate his
neighborly relationship with the Weills, but this use directly enhanced his
ability to participate in the economic and civic life of his community. 428
Boudreaux’s 60 years of continuous, uninterrupted use of the right of way
was not, at least in Justice Knoll’s eyes, a mere “innocent or occasional
invasion[]”429 of his neighbor’s property. It was essential to his well-being
and to his civic membership in the community. In a sense, Justice Knoll’s
opinion illustrates the kind of analysis that would be called for if Louisiana
courts were to recognize a presumption of sharing and were required to
examine whether that presumption was overcome through the lens of
indicia of giving and renunciation.
Justice Weimer’s concurring opinion also deserves praise in many
respects. For one, his opinion focuses from the outset on the problematic
relational nature of the conflict—what he calls “this vexatious dispute
between neighbors.”430 At first, he suggests that “[b]oth explicit
permission and tacit permission deriving from acts of ‘good
neighborhood’ by an owner can defeat the claim of someone who contends
425. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 567.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 567 (referring to Boudreaux’s use of the right of way to vote and
his participation in public meeting about road construction that might affect his
access to right of way).
429. Id. at 563 (quoting A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 139, in
4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 1997)).
430. Id. at 568.
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he benefits from adverse possession so as to acquire a servitude of passage
upon the owner’s property.”431 But he is also careful not to subscribe to
the majority’s broad view that a mere assertion of tacit permission by a
record owner immediately places the burden of proof on the claimant to
prove that his possession is not precarious. Indeed, his concurring opinion
may be understood, in this Article’s view, as an attempt to convince his
fellow justices and other Louisiana jurists that in this particular
neighborhood relationship it was the record owner, Cummings, who had
successfully rebutted the traditional presumption that the possessor,
Boudreaux, was possessing as owner. In other words, Justice Weimer’s
opinion is, in fact, already consonant with the kind of analysis that would
take place using a presumption of sharing and indicia of giving and
renunciation, except that he was required by the existing law to put the
burden of proof on Cummings, rather than Boudreaux.
To Justice Weimer, the facts of this case reveal a deeply collaborative
relationship of trust between Boudreaux and his initial neighbor, the Weill
family, that can most accurately be described as resulting in permissive
use of the right of way by Boudreaux. The most salient facts for Justice
Weimer relate to the placement of the gate in 1969.432 He correctly points
out that at the time this episode transpired, the Louisiana Civil Code did
not allow a discontinuous apparent servitude to be acquired by
prescription.433 Consequently, Boudreaux’s cooperation with the Weills in
relocating the gate cannot be explained by suggesting that Boudreaux was
merely complying with the requirement imposed by Article 748 of the
Civil Code on servitude holders to cooperate with servient estate owners
who seek to relocate a servitude to lessen its inconvenience.434 Because
Boudreaux could not have even begun to acquire a servitude of passage by
acquisitive prescription in 1969, the duty imposed on servitude holders to
cooperate with servient estate owners in servitude relocation is simply
immaterial.435
Just as important is Justice Weimer’s finding that “the collaborative
nature of the gate placement, its construction, and its later use to be direct
and relevant evidence that Mr. Boudreaux used the passageway with
‘permission’ as required by La. C.C. art. 3437, regardless of whether that
evidence was adduced on direct or cross examination.”436 Indeed, it is this
“evidence of neighborly acts on the part of the successive property
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 568–69.
Id. at 569 (discussing LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 (2008)).
Id. at 568–69 (discussing LA. CIV. CODE art. 748 (2008)).
Id. at 569.
Id.
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owners” that convinced Justice Weimer that Cummings had rebutted “the
presumption that might otherwise arise from the fact of Mr. Boudreaux’s
possession.”437 This Article interprets these statements to mean that Justice
Weimer still adheres to the traditional burden-shifting scheme established
by articles 3427 and 3438 of the Civil Code that Justice Knoll articulated
so clearly in her dissent.438 The rest of Justice Weimer’s concurrence
observes other salient facts that support his conclusion that the relationship
between Boudreaux and the Weills was essentially one of neighborly
collaboration in which the Weills consciously allowed Boudreaux, his
family, his tenants, and his workers to use the right of way, and Boudreaux
demonstrated his appreciation in a number reciprocal gestures.439
Justice Weimer’s opinion is also noteworthy because it is the only
opinion in the case that links its conclusion to any policy rationales for
bad-faith acquisitive prescription. Quoting Planiol,440 Weimer suggests
that bad-faith acquisitive prescription is primarily justified when a record
owner has been “guilty of negligence.”441 This suggestion is revealing
because Weimer does not see the Weills or Cummings as having been
guilty of negligence. To the contrary, they were merely acting as good
neighbors in letting Boudreaux use the right of way and engaging in a
long-term collaborative relationship to maintain that right of way.
Although Weimer might have explored some of other important rationales
offered by civil law commentators and U.S. property law scholars
justifying adverse possession and acquisitive prescription,442 his opinion
remains far more satisfying than the majority opinion. Furthermore, his
opinion certainly earns sympathy for its endorsement of the importance of
moral values in property law.443
Reasonable jurists can disagree about the correct outcome of a difficult
neighbor case involving an assertion of acquisitive prescription based on
more than 60 years of uninterrupted use of a rural right of way on one hand
437. Id.
438. Id. at 565−67, discussed supra note 424 and accompanying text.
439. Id. at 569–571 (noting that Boudreaux admitted that he used the
passageway to bring farm equipment to the Weill property to assist the Weills
with their rice harvest, that some agricultural workers—the Duhon boys—used
the passageway to harvest rice on both properties, and that the Weills used the
passageway and gate to visit Boudreaux and his wife for coffee on occasion).
440. Id. at 570–71 (quoting PLANIOL, supra note 47, § 3645, at 571–72).
441. Id. at 571.
442. See discussion supra notes 49−56, 115−37 and accompanying text.
443. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 571 (“Our venerable Civil Code generally
encourages moral conduct and deters immoral conduct.”). The Court lists several
examples of Civil Code rules that punish conduct many would consider immoral. Id.
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and a plausible precarious-possession defense on the other. However, both
Justice Knoll’s dissent and Justice Weimer’s concurrence each in their
own way begin to demonstrate how precarious possession must be
approached in a deeply contextualized manner that is sensitive to the actual
relationships between the parties.
2. Resolving Boudreaux with New Jurisprudential Tools
If another court were to examine the facts presented in Boudreaux in
light of the rebuttable presumption of sharing and the indicia of giving or
renunciation introduced above, an even more satisfactory solution might
be possible. The court would first recognize that initially the relationship
between Boudreaux and the record owners would be governed by the
presumption of sharing. Yet facts relating to the parties’ on-going
relationship might also reveal that over time the presumption had been
rebutted. For instance, Boudreaux’s extensive use of the right of way to
move heavy equipment across the Weill–Boudreaux farm could weigh in
favor of rebuttal under criteria (1). The work that Boudreaux performed to
maintain and relocate the right of way and the work that Boudreaux
performed on the gate could weigh in favor of rebuttal under either criteria
(2) or (3). The fact that Boudreaux used the right of way not just to move
farm equipment but to access a public road and to reach the nearest town
where his community life was based could weigh in favor of rebuttal under
criteria (3) as well. The absence of any clear signals by the Weills or
Cummings that they were maintaining their agenda-setting authority, other
than the Weills’ request to relocate the gate, could also point to rebuttal
under criteria (4). Any facts pertaining to community perceptions about
Boudreaux’s rights to use the path across the Weill–Cummings property
could have been interpreted under criteria (5). Finally, the 60-year history
of uninterrupted use of the right of way could itself weigh in favor of
rebuttal under criteria (6). In the end, a decision using this kind of analysis
might well have persuaded the Louisiana Supreme Court to affirm a
finding that Boudreaux had obtained a servitude of passage by acquisitive
prescription even though the Weills initially benefitted from a
presumption of sharing.444
444. To take another example, these tools might also help explain a result like
that reached in Delacroix Corp. v. Perez, 794 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
There, the limited use of the Delacroix land by Perez for cattle grazing and
crayfishing would have been relatively insignificant facts under criteria (1). The
fact that Perez only partially constructed a crawfish pond on the Delacroix land
would have been equally inconsequential under criteria (2). The complete absence
of any changes to his own property or to his own life projects and the absence of
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CONCLUSION
Controversial decisions like Boudreaux v. Cummings can cause dismay
and confusion in a legal community, but they can also start useful
conversations. This Article has attempted to begin one of those conversations.
Rather than merely complain about the confusing statements that emerged
from the majority opinion in Boudreaux, this Article has attempted to
reconstruct the law of precarious possession from the ground up.
This Article has shown how Louisiana’s two-tier system of good- and
bad-faith acquisitive prescription emerged from Roman law and precodification French and Spanish law. It has shown how French
commentators interpreted their codified version of that law and, in
particular, how they approached the problem of precarious possession with
caution, careful to respect the traditional presumption that a possessor
intends to possess as owner but aware that in disputes between neighbors
who share a long-term relationship of cooperation there may be instances
in which use or access results from simple tolerance. It has also shown
why Louisiana’s two-tier system of acquisitive prescription is a valuable
institution that should not be torn apart by overly broad application of the
concept of precarious possession to claims of 30-year acquisitive
prescription in particular.
In addition, this Article has reviewed a significant body of Louisiana
case law to demonstrate that when courts confront stranger and contractual
and legal status relationship cases, Louisiana case law generally reaches
defensible and consistent outcomes that make sense of Louisiana’s
traditional presumptions and burdens of proof regarding possession. Yet,
when they approach the most difficult category of possession and
acquisitive prescription cases—those involving true neighbors or
members of the same close-knit community—courts face acute challenges
and often produce inconsistent results. To resolve this kind of case with
greater sensitivity to the virtue of property sharing and to the specific
relational context of these disputes, Louisiana property law would benefit
from the adoption of a presumption of sharing and concomitant indicia of
giving and renunciation.

testimony about community perceptions about a change in title would have also
not have availed his rebuttal assertion under criteria (3) and (5). Finally,
Delacroix’s continued agenda-setting actions with respect to the land in dispute,
along with Perez’s admissions in his lease letter, would have weighed against
rebuttal under criteria (4) and (7).

